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Abstract  
 
Feminist critiques of multiculturalism have largely focused on group rights by looking at 
multicultural societies that are based on pluralism. However, in some countries of new 
immigration, such as South Korea, multiculturalism does not necessarily have a pluralist form, 
but instead pursues assimilation. Thus South Korea provides an opportunity to explore 
gendered aspects of multiculturalism in a different context from that upon which the existing 
feminist critiques are largely based.  
What are the gendered aspects of South Korean multiculturalism? In this study I address this 
question by looking at policies designed particularly for female marriage migrants. I argue 
that the aim of these policies is to make such migrants contribute to South Korea’s 
multicultural nation-building process through their reproductive, care-giving, and symbolic 
functions in the idealized Korean family and that patriarchy is reinforced in the 
implementation of these policies. This reinforcement of patriarchy has resulted in a 
perpetuation of gender inequality. Looking at the ways in which the South Korean 
government uses female marriage migrants as instruments in its nation-building process 
expands the current scope of feminist critiques of multiculturalism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Contents 
 
Acknowledgments                                                                                                                
                   
                                                                                                                                              Page 
 
Introduction                                                                                                                                1 
 
Chapter One: Feminist Critiques of Multiculturalism                                                              16 
 
Chapter Two: Gendered Nation and Culture; Research Design                                               24 
 
Chapter Three: The South Korean Context                                                                              38 
 
Chapter Four: Female Marriage Migrants in South Korea’s Nation-Building                        52 
 
Conclusion                                                                                                                                72 
 
 
Appendices                                                                                                                               76 
Bibliography                                                                                                                             78 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Acknowledgments 
 
I would like to thank my supervisors Dr Robbie Shilliam, Dr Stephen Epstein and Dr Pat 
Moloney for their excellent guidance and encouragement to help me to produce this thesis.  
I presented sections of this study at three conferences: the Annual Interdisciplinary Graduate 
Conference 2011 at the University of Waikato; the Eighth Graduate Conference in Asian 
Studies at the University of Auckland; and the 2011 NZ Political Studies 
Association Conference. I thank the audiences for their reflective comments and suggestions. 
I also thank Dr Mary Roberts for her help in improving my academic writing skills and her 
time spent in sharing thoughts and ideas.  
I also have to thank my friend Erina Okeroa for welcoming me to our office and sharing a 
fabulous time with me. We worked hard and laughed hard at the office together. I thank 
Byron Collins for his generosity, support and trust in me. I am grateful to have had all of 
them next to me during the work on this thesis.  
This project was supported by the Asia New Zealand Foundation; I am sincerely thankful to 
the organization for its generosity in enabling me to complete the project successfully. Lastly, 
I thank my interviewees in Korea for their time and willingness to participate in the project. 
This project could not have been completed without their help.  
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Introduction  
 
The concept of multiculturalism has several interpretations. For example, the term can 
be used to describe ethnocultural diversity in a society, in a normative sense to shape 
the way in which diversity should be treated, or as a state policy tool to develop and 
implement measures in order to “govern” diversity. In this study I primarily discuss 
multiculturalism as a policy tool at the state level. The origin of this policy-oriented 
concept can be found in Canada in the late 1960s, where it was first termed 
“Multiculturalism within a Bilingual Framework” to accommodate growing Québec 
nationalism and used to strengthen linguistic duality.
1
 In the late 1980s, the concept 
was developed into a basis for the country‟s “Multiculturalism Act.”2 Since then, the 
concept has been used as a policy tool in other Western countries, such as Australia, 
the US, Britain and (arguably) New Zealand. The democratic values, such as human 
rights, freedom, equality and peace that these countries commonly uphold grounded 
the introduction of multiculturalism, which aimed to resolve discrimination and 
injustice suffered by minorities, and to accommodate their needs.  
Until this notion of multiculturalism became popular in the late 20
th
 century, most 
countries made up of diverse ethnic groups, such as Australia and Canada, commonly 
upheld hierarchies favoring the dominant culture, and implemented various 
assimilationist policies which aspired to eliminate “inferior” cultures and construct a 
monocultural nation. Under that aim, minorities (i.e. immigrants, national minorities, 
and indigenous peoples)
3
 were often marginalized or forced to assimilate to the 
mainstream culture. Diversity was perceived as a threat to the unity of the nation. 
With the introduction of multiculturalism, this perception, and these aspirations to 
establish a monocultural nation, underwent change.  
The perception of diversity as threat has not vanished, and has strengthened among 
some multicultural societies, especially due to the influence of the 9/11 attacks in the 
United States, and the London bombings of 2005. There has been a growing criticism 
                                                             
1 Andrew Heywood, Political Ideologies (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 310. 
2 Ibid. 
3 In this study, I focus on “immigrants” because my case study of multiculturalism in South Korea was 
born as a result of an influx of foreign nationals in recent years. The country does not have a sizeable 
national minority group, or another indigenous population apart from South Koreans themselves.  
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against, and a retreat from, multiculturalism. European leaders such as David 
Cameron, Angela Merkel and Nicholas Sarkozy have criticized multiculturalism for 
undermining national unity.
4
 As I will explain more in depth in the following chapter, 
multiculturalism has also been under attack because “group rights” that are given to 
minority groups to retain their identities are sometimes viewed as tolerating 
maltreatment of women within such groups. Some countries, such as Australia, the 
Netherlands and the UK, have reduced the scale of their multicultural policies in 
recent years.
5
 Overall, the social and political contexts surrounding multiculturalism 
have changed since the 1990s, when an “uncritical consensus” allowed those who 
criticized multiculturalism to be viewed as racists or cultural imperialists.
6
 However, 
despite concern over, and partial retreat from, multiculturalism, most Western, 
democratic countries have maintained a goal of becoming multicultural rather than 
monocultural (in this study, a monocultural nation means one that is believed to 
consist of a single, often homogenized, culture, whereas a multicultural nation is one 
that recognizes and supports the existence of multiple cultures within it). Minorities 
not forced to assimilate as they were decades earlier, and populations are encouraged 
to view diversity more positively. This change in the perception of diversity, and the 
efforts made by governments in its service, is a core characteristic of the 
implementation of the concept of multiculturalism into practice. Despite pressure, it 
has proved persistent.   
But a consistent trend toward multiculturalism does not dictate uniform policy. 
Different nations are home to different historical, social and political contexts, and as 
a result, over the past decades, different types of multiculturalism have emerged. Thus 
Banting, Johnston, Kymlicka and Soroka are wary of generalizing multiculturalism.
7
 
                                                             
4 Danny Dorling, “More Division over Multiculturalism,” The Guardian, February 9, 2011. It seems 
the criticism by the leaders was, in part, politically motivated. For instance, in reference to David 
Cameron‟s condemnation of multiculturalism, Dorling argued that, by condemning multiculturalism, 
the Prime Minister intended to change the direction of anger against his government's cuts from 
bankers toward the nation‟s Muslim communities. 
5 Christian Joppke, “The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy,” The 
British Journal of Sociology 55, no. 2 (2004): 243-54. 
6 Anne Phillips, Multiculturalism without Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 3; 
Susan Okin, ed., Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1999), 9. 
7 Keith Banting et al., “Do Multiculturalism Policies Erode the Welfare State? An Empirical Analysis,” 
in Multiculturalism and the Welfare State, ed. Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 54. 
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They distinguish different types of multiculturalism based on a nation‟s policies and 
classify these policies into three different categories depending on those affected: 
immigrants, national minorities, or indigenous peoples.
8
 According to their empirical 
analysis, which focuses particularly on policies designed for immigrants, 
multiculturalism in Australia and Canada is “strong,” while in the UK, US and New 
Zealand it is “modest,” and in Denmark, France, Germany and Japan it is “weak.”9 
This ranking changes, however, when focused on policies designed for national 
minorities or indigenous peoples. Thus multiculturalism varies. In fact, because 
multiculturalism is not an ideology per se, but rather a debating arena for different 
ideological stances, analysis of multiculturalism will provide a different view of the 
“right” balance between diversity and unity according to the ideological foundation it 
is based on (i.e. liberal multiculturalism, pluralist multiculturalism, or cosmopolitan 
multiculturalism).
10
 Thus there is no consensus between (or within) individual 
countries about how multiculturalism should look either in practice or in theory.  
Nevertheless, regardless of their differences, these societies share at least one 
common purpose in their implementation of multiculturalism: nation-building. As 
widely argued, a nation is not a natural or pre-extant phenomenon, but rather a 
socially constructed entity. Benedict Anderson, one of the most prominent scholars in 
the literature on nationhood, has defined a nation as an “imagined” community.11 
Members of a nation create it by engaging in a shared mental vision of community 
with other members of the nation. Thus nation-building is an ongoing process of 
construction of a nation through this imagining. As mentioned at the outset of this 
thesis, before the introduction of multiculturalism, many nation-building projects 
were designed to establish a “homogenous” nation. However, as a result of increasing 
political consciousness about democratic values and growing diversity due to 
globalization and international migration, some Western countries now focus on 
constructing a multicultural society in their nation-building.  
Yet a multicultural nation is still a nation, and the main goal of multiculturalism is to 
maintain not merely unity among populations sharing a geographic space, but a 
                                                             
8 Banting et al., “Do Multiculturalism Policies Erode the Welfare State?,” 58. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Heywood, Political Ideologies, 322-6. 
11 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1991), 6. 
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national identity. For example, in Great Britain, a national identity based on the 
notion of “Britishness” has continued to be emphasized under multiculturalism. 12 
“Britishness” here stands for a set of values, such as liberty, fairness and enterprise, 
which ground a British national identity, and which the nation‟s citizens are 
encouraged to believe that they share.
13
 Also, some frequently circulated words and 
phrases in current multicultural societies, such as “integration,” “social cohesion,” and 
“unity within diversity” all indicate the nation-building purpose of multiculturalism. 
Favell pays particular attention to the frequent use of the word “integration” under 
multiculturalism, which he says “points us back towards the old fashioned nation-
building paradigm in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to create unified territorial 
nations out of the patchwork of distinct regions, ethnicities, classes, social 
divisions.”14 In his view, the old framework has continued to operate because many 
“mainstream” academics and policy makers are aware of the heavy price that they 
will pay if they challenge “the [existing] supremacy of the restorative nation-building 
frame” in their discussions of multiculturalism.15 
This suggests that while the concept of multiculturalism may extend the imagined 
boundaries of the nation by replacing older criteria for membership, such as “race” or 
shared history and shared ancestors, with “civic values” that allow ethnocultural 
minorities to be considered part of a nation, it has not demolished the national 
boundaries themselves. Even under multiculturalism, nations employ a process of 
exclusion to determine who belongs to the nation and who does not. The creation and 
maintenance of national boundaries has always been an important part of nation-
building projects, and remains in societies that have adopted multiculturalism as a 
policy tool. In other words, the ultimate aim of multicultural societies is to construct a 
stronger nation, while taking into consideration the needs and claims of minority 
groups. Therefore, this study focuses on this core purpose of multiculturalism: the 
maintenance of the nation in an era of globalization and international migration. 
                                                             
12
 Tariq Modood, “Multiculturalism and Nation Building Go Hand in Hand,” The Guardian, May 23, 
2007.  
13 Ibid.  
14 Adrian Favell, “Debate on „Immigration Policy‟: Multicultural Nation-building: „Integration‟ as 
Public Philosophy and Research Paradigm in Western Europe,” Swiss Political Science Review 7, no. 2 
(2001): 120. 
15 Ibid., 119. 
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In spite of the centrality of nation-building to multiculturalism as policy, it has not 
been treated extensively in discussions of multiculturalism. Instead, literature on the 
topic has been largely occupied with culture, justice and equality (especially 
ideological and political debates surrounding multicultural group rights) rather than 
nation and nationalism.
16
 The same holds true for feminist critiques of 
multiculturalism, which have overwhelmingly focused on revealing patriarchy within 
the cultures of minority groups living in Western societies, and on problematizing 
multiculturalism in tolerating this existence of patriarchy. For example, Susan Okin, a 
prominent feminist scholar, argued that multiculturalism can be harmful because it 
allows minority groups to maintain cultural practices oppressive to women.
17
 Other 
feminist scholars have, at least in part, shared Okin‟s concern about the danger of 
cultural relativism under a pluralist form of multiculturalism.
18
 
Although I shall also use feminist critiques of multiculturalism, I argue that at present 
they are applicable only to a limited number of countries where multicultural group 
rights exist. Most frequently, feminist scholars have problematized such rights in 
relation to Muslim communities in Western, democratic, pluralist, multicultural 
countries that have a long history of cultural diversity and sizeable minority groups 
whose legal and social status enables them to claim such rights. Growth in these 
minority groups has been facilitated because immigrants are allowed to bring in 
family members.
19
 Since many immigrants arrive as families, their households help 
                                                             
16
 See the “liberal vs communitarian” debate on multiculturalism; the advocates of the pluralist form of 
multiculturalism who support granting “group rights” to minorities as a way for restoring equality 
between majority and minority groups, for example: Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and "The 
Politics of Recognition": An Essay by Charles Taylor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 
and Will Kymlicka, “Liberal Complacencies,” in Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, ed. Susan Okin 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999); the liberal (feminist) scholars who question the 
premises of multiculturalism, for example: Brian Barry, Culture & Equality (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2001); Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, and Phillips, Multiculturalism without Culture. 
17 Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, 17-20. 
18 For example: Katha Pollitt, “Whose Culture?” and Saskia Sassen, “Culture beyond Gender,” in Is 
Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, ed. Susan Okin (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999); 
Ayelet Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women's Rights (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001); Phillips, Multiculturalism without Culture; Sarah Song, Justice, 
Gender, and the Politics of Multiculturalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
19 This family-related immigration has been one of the main legal entry channels in these countries. For 
example, in the USA, family-related immigration makes up almost two-thirds of the total immigration. 
In Canada or in Australia, it accounts for between one-third and a quarter of the total immigration. See 
“World Migration 2008- Chapter 6. Family Migration,” IOM World Migration Report Series 4, (2008): 
151. 
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them maintain pre-existing cultural identities in the host society. Against this 
backdrop, the idea of multicultural group rights was born in such societies, and these 
rights have been at the center of feminist debates on multiculturalism. As my focus is 
South Korea, such discussions cannot be applied indiscriminately, but must be 
problematized to address a Korean context.  
 
South Korean Multiculturalism  
Though much of the scholarship to deal with multiculturalism has addressed Western 
nations, multiculturalism has not only been implemented in the West, but in many 
East Asian societies that have recently experienced an influx of immigrants, 
particularly South Korea (henceforth Korea), Japan, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong 
Kong. High economic growth in these places in the late 20
th
 century has been one of 
the key factors influencing immigration in the region, especially from less wealthy 
areas of Asia. Unlike neighboring countries that have histories of cultural diversity, 
the Korean peninsula has had a long history of ethnic homogeneity, and South Korea 
has only recently begun to experience a significant increase in the number of foreign 
nationals since the mid-1990s. The number in 2011 reached an official record high: 
1,418,149, which makes up almost 3% of the nation‟s population.20  
Although this figure may seem insignificant compared to other countries such as 
Canada (where about 20% of total population are foreign-born in the 2006 Census),
21
 
the Korean figure is particularly striking when one considers that it represents 
thirteen–fold growth since 1995. 22  According to research commissioned by the 
Ministry of Strategy and Finance, the number of foreign residents in Korea could 
reach seven million (20% of the total population) by 2040.
23
 The country‟s low birth 
                                                             
20 Korea Immigration Service, “Current Status of Foreign Residents by Nationality (Third Quarter 
2011),” accessed 03 January, 2012, http://www.immigration.go.kr; Seoul Economy, “Foreign Residents 
Exceed 1.4 Million ... Close to 3% of Total Population.” December 16, 2011.  
21 Statistics Canada. “Immigration in Canada: A Portrait of the Foreign-born Population, 2006 Census: 
Immigration: Driver of Population Growth,” accessed January 17, 2012, http://www12.statcan.ca.  
22 Andrew Eungi Kim, “Increasing Ethnic Diversity in South Korea: An Introductory Essay,” Korea 
Observer 41, no. 4 (2010): 497. 
23 Jong-gwan Lee et al., Report on Quality of Life for Koreans in 2040 (Seoul: Hybrid-Culture 
Institution, Sungkyunkwan University, 2010), 155.  
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rate, ageing population, and consequent expected decrease in the number of prime-age 
workers are likely to force the Korean government to relax its borders further.  
Countries new to immigration, like South Korea, often do not have sizeable minority 
groups that can readily lay claim to rights vis-à-vis the majority. Not only because the 
history of immigration is recent, but because most foreign residents in these countries 
arrive without accompanying family members, since these countries rarely allow 
immigrants to bring them in.
24
  
The largest category of foreign residents in Korea is workers, who had reached 
600,138 by 2011 (42% of total foreign residents).
25
 Among these workers, the vast 
majority, 552,746 (92%), are non-professionals
26
 who arrived in Korea under the 
Employment Permit System introduced by the Foreign Worker Policy Committee in 
2004 to allow employers who struggle to hire local workers to recruit foreigners as an 
alternative workforce. These employers experience difficulty in finding workers 
because the jobs they offer are high risk and low status, and are considered by 
Koreans as “3D” (dirty, dangerous and difficult) jobs. More than half (53%) of 
foreign workers are from China,
27
 while others are from Vietnam (11.1%), the 
Philippines (5.1%), and Indonesia (4.8%). The next biggest group of foreign residents 
is made up of marriage migrants, 143,253 in 2011 (10% of total number of foreign 
residents), the majority of them female (86% of the total number of marriage 
migrants).
28
 Among marriage migrants, the largest proportion (about 43%) are from 
China,
29
 followed by women from Vietnam (29%), Japan (8%), and the Philippines 
(6%), and several other countries, almost entirely from Asia. 
The majority of foreign workers enter as individuals under the Employment Permit 
System, which does not allow them to bring family members. The system allows 
workers to obtain a work permit for up to 4 years and 10 months, which prevents 
                                                             
24  “World Migration 2008,” 151. 
25 Korea Immigration Service. “Current Status of Foreign Residents based on Employment (Third 
Quarter 2011),” accessed 04 January, 2012, http://www.immigration.go.kr.  
26
 Ibid. 
27 The majority of these Chinese workers are Chinese nationals of Korean descent. See Korea 
Immigration Service. “Current Status of Foreign Workers by Nationality (Third Quarter 2011),” 
accessed 03 January, 2012, http://www.immigration.go.kr.  
28 Korea Immigration Service. “Current Status of Marriage-based Immigrants by Nationality (Third 
Quarter 2011),” accessed 04 January, 2012, http://www.immigration.go.kr.  
29 Ibid.; 41.5% of female marriage-based immigrants from China are of Korean descent. 
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them from meeting the requirement of 5 year minimum stay in Korea to be eligible to 
apply for naturalization.
30
 However, marriage migrants are allowed to stay and apply 
for permanent residency and citizenship as long as they maintain their marital status 
with a Korean citizen. Additionally, they are allowed to bring dependent children 
from previous relationships. Although the number of such children has been 
increasing, official figures are not yet available. By 2011, foreign residents who came 
to Korea for the purpose of visiting or living with family based on the F-1 Family 
Visitation visa (43,920) and the F-3 Dependent Family visa (17,214) made up only 
4.3% of the total number of foreign residents.
31
 The experiences of these migrants 
differ from those common to countries with histories of immigration. Particularly, the 
“private” sphere into which they enter does not function as readily as a place for 
foreign residents to practice and maintain their cultural identities. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that the concept of multicultural group rights does not yet exist. For this 
reason many aspects of feminist critiques of multiculturalism prevalent in the West 
are not applicable in countries new to immigration, like South Korea.  
In this thesis, I follow the generalized use of the distinction between the “private” and 
“public” sphere, the former as a domain concerning personal matters, family and 
households, and the latter concerning politics, government and state. I use this 
division since feminist critiques of multiculturalism have been based on such a 
division. Nevertheless, as some other feminist scholars have argued, I believe this 
division is patriarchal because it justifies the relegation of women and their roles to 
the private sphere, as well as obscuring the fact that various private matters related to 
family are, in fact, public and political.
32
 Consequently, while I do use these terms, a 
critical, feminist view on the division grounds my analysis of the Korean government 
intervention into the private sphere of female marriage migrants for nation-building 
purposes, and I will demonstrate that the public and political aspects of the “private” 
by discussing the importance of such sphere in terms of nation-building (Chapter 
Four).  
                                                             
30 Soe Moe Thu (Producer/Reporter at Migrant World TV, interview by author, July 11, 2011; Korea 
Tourism Organization, “Korea Visas & Passports,” accessed 26 February, 2012, 
http://english.visitkorea.or.kr; Korea Immigration Service, “Visas & Immigration,” accessed 26 
February, 2012, http://www.immigration.go.kr.   
31 Korea Immigration Service, “Current Status of Foreign Residents by Visa (Third Quarter 2011),” 
accessed 04 January, 2012, http://www.immigration.go.kr.  
32 Anne Phillips, Democracy & Difference (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1993), 63, 85-6. 
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With the increasing number of foreign residents in Korean society, issues of 
discrimination have risen to the surface. According to the 2007 UN Report of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, in Korea there is “the 
persistence of widespread societal discrimination against foreigners, including 
migrant workers and children born from inter-ethnic unions, in all areas of life, 
including employment, marriage, housing, education and interpersonal relationships 
[emphasis added].”33 People of Chinese descent (called hwagyo) 34 and children of 
inter-ethnic unions (called honhyeola, literally “mixed-blood children”)35 have been 
two earlier groups discriminated against because of their ethnic origin: the former 
since the late Joseon dynasty and the latter since the mid- and late 20
th
 century.
 
 
With the recent increase in the number of foreign workers and female marriage 
migrants, issues of discrimination and abuse have been spotlighted. According to 
Amnesty International, foreign workers have been continuously exposed to 
discrimination and extremely poor work conditions without receiving adequate 
protection from the government.
36
 A survey from 2011 reports that 78% of foreign 
workers in Korea have suffered verbal abuse, 26.8% physical abuse, and 13.5% 
sexual abuse in their workplace, and that 13% receive less than the legal minimum 
wage.
37
 Similarly, many female marriage migrants are also paid less than their Korean 
counterparts and suffer from long working hours and low, late, or even unpaid 
                                                             
33 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “2007 Annual Report of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,” accessed 23 October, 2011, 
http://tb.ohchr.org/.  
34 In this thesis, I use the government‟s revised Romanization system for transliterating Korean words 
to English. For more information about the people of Chinese descent in Korea, see In-Jin Yoon, 
“Multicultural Minority Groups and Multicultural Coexistence in Korean Society,” Korea Observer 41, 
no. 4 (2010): 538-42. 
35 For more information, see: Timothy Lim, “Who is Korean? Migration, Immigration, and the 
Challenge of Multiculturalism in Homogeneous Societies,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 
March 16, 2011, http://japanfocus.org/-Timothy-Lim/3192.  
36
 Amnesty International, “South Korea - Amnesty International Report 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010,” 
accessed January 04, 2012, http://www.amnesty.org.  
37  Yonhapnews, “78% of Migrant Workers Face Verbal Abuse,” August 11, 2011. Under the 
Employment Permit System, workers are not allowed to change their workplace without permission 
from the Ministry of Justice. This restriction on changing their workplace has made it very difficult for 
foreign workers to resist unfair treatment and abuses by their Korean employers and has contributed to 
the abuse of these workers by Korean employers.  
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wages.
38
 As well as facing discrimination in the workplace and general society, 
female marriage migrants suffer discrimination and abuse in their own households.
 
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and 
Amnesty International have pointed out the existence of discrimination against, and 
abuses of, female marriage migrants by their Korean family members.
39  
This issue of discrimination against and abuse of female marriage migrants in their 
own households attracts particular attention from scholars of multiculturalism for two 
different reasons: first, racial discrimination is usually associated with the public 
sphere, but abuse of female marriage migrants in their own households requires a 
rethinking of this association and supports the claim that the private sphere is not 
always based on intimacy and romance, but also on hierarchical relationships between 
family members.
40
 Secondly, it is this particular issue that has led to the adoption of 
multiculturalism as a policy tool in Korea. The Korean government agencies have 
implemented measures under the name of multiculturalism particularly to facilitate 
the adaptation of marriage migrant women to the Korean family and society.
41
 As Soe 
Moe Thu, a well-known activist for rights of foreign residents in Korea, said in an 
interview, “female marriage migrants do have difficulties, but they are treated well 
[by the government] compared to other foreign residents in Korea…they receive 
special treatment through policy, but foreign workers or refugees live with severe 
difficulties as a result of the institutional exclusion and discrimination.”42  
Here it is important to explain the different use of the key official terms “foreigners 
(oegugin),” “overseas Koreans (jaeoedongpo),” and “immigrants (iminja)” by the 
Ministry of Justice, the central government agency in the implementation of policies 
affecting foreign nationals in Korea (there is as yet no special government agency in 
charge of immigration in Korea), and in assigning tasks to other government 
                                                             
38 Seo-young Jang et al., “Foundation Research for Development of Employment Support Programs for 
Female Marriage-based Immigrants,” Ministry of Labor and Korea Employment Information Service, 
accessed January 7, 2012, http://keis.or.kr.  
39 Amnesty International, “South Korea - Amnesty International Report 2008”; Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “2007 Annual Report of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination.”  
40 Patricia Collins, “It‟s All in the Family: Intersections of Gender, Race, and Nation.” Hypatia 13, no. 
3 (1998): 62-4. 
41 For an distribution of tasks for each agency, see Ministry of Justice, Republic of Korea, “The First 
Basic Plan regarding Policy for Foreigners, 2008-2012,” accessed January 10, 2012, 
http://www.moj.go.kr.  
42 Soe Moe Thu (Producer/Reporter at Migrant World TV, interview by author, July 11, 2011. 
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agencies.
43
 The Ministry of Justice uses “foreigners” to describe people who are 
originally from other countries, and have neither Korean citizenship nor Korean blood, 
but are living in Korea. The ministry categorizes foreign nationals who have a Korean 
parent or grandparent separately from “foreigners,” and calls them “overseas Koreans.” 
Lastly, the ministry uses “immigrants” to refer to foreigners or overseas Koreans who 
have married a Korean citizen, officially called “marriage-based immigrants 
(gyeolhoniminja),” referred to in this thesis as marriage migrants. This categorization 
is not rigid since individuals can belong to more than one category. For example, 
many foreign workers and female marriage-based immigrants are also overseas 
Koreans, mostly Chinese citizens of Korean descent. 
The term “multicultural (damunhwa)” is often popularly used in relation to all these 
people, regardless of how they are officially categorized by the Ministry of Justice. 
However, the ministry and other government agencies primarily reserves the term 
“multicultural” for female marriage migrants, even though such women make up only 
about 10% of total foreign residents in Korea.
44
 The Support for Multicultural 
Families Act, which prescribes various polices affecting these women and their 
families, is the only law that has been enacted under the name of multiculturalism. 
Korean multiculturalism is not designed to address the needs of those whom the 
Ministry of Justice defines as foreigners or overseas Koreans. Laws and policies 
related to foreigners are still framed with the word, “foreign (oeguk)” instead of 
“multicultural.” Neither are ethnic preferential policies for overseas Koreans framed 
as “multicultural.” Foreigners and overseas Koreans married to Korean citizens are 
the only ones covered by the legal and official multicultural framework. As I will be 
arguing in this thesis, through multiculturalism, the government embraces only those 
whom it terms “immigrants,” but intends to exclude others. This government attitude 
towards “immigrants” (overwhelmingly female marriage migrants) can be explained 
by the simple fact that they are the only group of foreign nationals that are allowed to 
settle down permanently in Korean society. However this simple explanation obscures 
the fact that the government has a vested interest in female marriage migrants. 
                                                             
43 For the use of different terms, see Ministry of Justice, Republic of Korea, “The First Basic Plan 
regarding Policy for Foreigners, 2008-2012,” accessed January 10, 2012, http://www.moj.go.kr.  
44 Hyun Mee Kim, “Multicultural Discourse and Policy in Korean Society” (paper presented at the 
2008 Jeju Human Rights Conference, Jeju, June 26-29, 2008).  
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In this thesis, I mention the name of government agencies only when I first introduce 
a particular policy or discuss official documents. Apart from these cases, in order to 
streamline my prose, I simply use  “the government” since all agencies of the Korean 
government are, in fact, committed to constructing a multicultural society even 
though they may disagree or compete with each other in terms of the details of 
policies affecting foreign residents. 
South Korea makes a particularly interesting case study because of the strong and 
continuing, though dissipating, belief in ethnic homogeneity among many Koreans. 
Until recently, Koreans were encouraged to believe that their nation consists of people 
who share the same bloodline, and were taught to be proud of this ethnic 
homogeneity.
45
 Along with Iceland and Portugal, Korea has been frequently cited as 
an example of one of the most monoethnic countries in the world.
46
 Against this 
background, Korean multiculturalism has been perceived by the public as involving 
an attempt to combat ongoing discrimination against foreign residents, which is 
believed to be a side-effect of the strong belief in ethnic homogeneity.
47
 This means 
that multiculturalism in Korea has been introduced without necessarily embracing 
pluralism or cultural relativism.  
This minimally progressive form of multiculturalism has been strengthened because 
the Korean government has introduced multiculturalism as a policy tool with a view 
toward minimizing the impact of ethnocultural diversity on the pre-existing national 
culture, identity and unity. Although the government has promoted cultural diversity 
as a positive phenomenon that is a “valuable social resource” in the globalized era,48 
in reality, their policies have reflected aspirations to integrate foreign residents, 
especially female marriage migrants, into society by assimilating them to Korean 
culture.
49
  
                                                             
45 Sang-hun Choe, “South Koreans Struggle with Race,” The New York Times, November 2, 2009. 
46 Will Kymlicka, “Multicultural States and Intercultural Citizens,” Theory and Research in Education 
1, no. 2 (2003): 149. 
47 Hyun Mee Kim, “The State and Migrant Women: Diverging Hopes in the Making of „Multicultural 
Families‟ in Contemporary Korea,” Korea Journal 47, no. 4 (2007): 103. 
48 Ministry of Justice, Republic of Korea, “The First Basic Plan regarding Policies for Foreigners, 
2008-2012, 34. 
49 Geon-Soo Han, “Multicultural Korea: Celebration or Challenge of Multiethnic Shift in 
Contemporary Korea?” Korea Journal 47, no. 4 (2007): 35. 
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It is necessary to explain my use of “culture” in this thesis. I recognize that culture is 
complex and vibrant, and also that its definition is contested. Nevertheless, I wish to 
use the term here in a normative sense to refer to a set of values and practices that 
determine the appropriate ways of how human activities, especially within (but not 
limited to) the private sphere, should be carried out among a particular group. 
Patriarchy, then, lies at the core of “culture,” and serves as a mechanism for power 
holders to retain control within a given groups under the name of its culture. I 
frequently use the term “idealized” culture, that is, an essentialized culture based on 
patriarchal norms and practices, and operating in order to serve the interests of these 
power holders. As I will argue in this thesis, the influence of this particular use of 
culture is not limited to the private sphere, but it underpins the public realm due to its 
importance as a foundation of the nation that is often conceived as a family related by 
blood. 
The reason the nation-building purpose of multiculturalism has been emphasized in 
Korea is because of a belief that national unity and patriotism are crucial for national 
development. This belief among Koreans appears based on their experience of 
achieving high economic and social development in the mid- to late 20
th
 century when 
nationalist and patriotic discourses motivated people to work hard for the nation. In a 
similar fashion, the government often frames constructing a multicultural society 
without discrimination against foreigners as an important patriotic task for Koreans, 
so that Korea can become a “world-class,” advanced nation (seonjinguk), as 
demonstrated by President Lee Myung-bak‟s statement in relation to the incident of a 
Vietnamese female marriage migrant killed by her Korean husband in 2010: “unless 
[foreign residents‟] tears dry up, Korea cannot become a truly advanced country even 
though its GDP increases.”50 Therefore the Korean nation-building project based on 
multiculturalism seems to be “Janus-faced:” 51  by using multiculturalism, the 
government intends to retain both national unity based on the traditional national 
identity, and to ensure national progress. 
                                                             
50 KTV (Government Broadcasting Service), “President Lee 44th Radio & Internet Speech,” accessed 
April 10, 2012, http://www.ktv.go.kr. 
51 John Hutchinson, “Ethnicity and Modern Nations,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 23, no. 4 (2000): 651-
2. 
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A correlation becomes clear, then, between the nation-building purpose of 
multiculturalism and the Korean government‟s interest in female marriage migrants 
and subsequent intervention on their behalf. Against this background, I therefore raise 
a series of questions: 1) to what extent does the Korean government give 
“preferential” 52  treatment to female marriage migrants in comparison to other 
categories of foreigners? 2) what is the purpose of such treatment on the part of the 
government? 3) what implications does my study of the “preferential” treatment of 
migrant women have for feminist critiques of multiculturalism? I plan to explore 
these questions by focusing on government laws and policies affecting female 
marriage migrants (Chapter Four). I will pay particular attention to the nation-wide 
agencies sponsored by the Ministry of the Gender Equality & Family, called 
Multicultural Family Support Centers (MFSCs), that are at the core of the 
implementation of such policies in practice.      
In order to expand the scope of feminist critiques of multiculturalism, I will draw on 
feminist theories of the nation which have problematized the patriarchal construction 
of nations, and the absence of women in the discourses of nationhood. In bringing 
women‟s participation in, and contribution to, nation-building to the surface, feminist 
scholars have shed light on the roles women play in this process that are undervalued 
due to patriarchy. In addition, feminist critiques of multiculturalism that have paid 
attention to the relationship between culture, family (more broadly, the private sphere) 
and gender present insights relevant to this study. A synthesis of these feminist 
theories regarding nation, culture, and patriarchy will provide the theoretical 
framework for this study.  
My arguments, in analyzing the government multicultural family policies at the core 
of Korean multiculturalism, are threefold: first, Korean multiculturalism is structured 
by the government as part of a nation-building project. Secondly, this nation-building 
project is carried out based on the notion of patriarchy. Lastly, government policies 
for female marriage migrants have been implemented in order to encourage these 
women to contribute to the patriarchal nation-building process through having them 
                                                             
52 I describe the government treatment for female marriage migrants as “preferential” because such 
treatment is only available for these women, not for other categories of foreigners in Korea. However, I 
argue in Chapter Three and Four that this government treatment is problematic because it results in 
breaching these women‟s rights.   
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symbolize idealized female roles within traditional Korean family and culture, as 
biological and cultural reproducers of the nation, caregivers for the elderly, and 
saviors of declining rural communities. This Korean case study contributes to feminist 
critiques of multiculturalism by demonstrating the ways in which patriarchy works 
through multiculturalism, not only in the private sphere (as already argued by feminist 
scholars), but also in the public sphere, due to its employment by the Korean 
government for the purpose of national-building.  
The study that follows comprises four additional chapters. In the first, I identify the 
main concerns about multiculturalism in feminist literature on the topic. In addition, I 
look into gendered aspects of multiculturalism in Korea by referring to Korean 
feminist work on female marriage migrants. This is a relatively short chapter as my 
intention is to clarify the contribution of my study to the existing literature, however, I 
will return to this literature in the following chapter to further elicit feminist insights 
into the patriarchal nature of culture. In the second chapter, I discuss two different 
groups of feminist theories: those that identify the ways in which women have been 
mobilized for the purpose of nation-building, and those that highlight the gendered 
implications of culture. In this chapter, I explain my research design and the methods 
that I have used. In the third chapter, I apply these two different groups of feminist 
theories to the Korean situation and address the specific historical, cultural and spatial 
surroundings in which many female marriage migrants settle. In the fourth chapter, I 
examine government policies designed for female marriage migrants and their 
families, and discuss the purposes of these policies. I conclude by discussing the 
ramifications of my case study for existing feminist critiques of multiculturalism.  
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Chapter One: Feminist Critiques of Multiculturalism 
 
As I discussed in the introduction to this thesis, feminist scholars have problematized 
multicultural group rights and their possible negative impact on women. Feminist 
literature on multiculturalism has produced significant insights to add to the larger 
literature on the topic. Mainly by using cases of Muslim immigrant families in 
Western multicultural societies, feminist scholars have argued that multiculturalism 
tolerates the weakening of Muslim women‟s rights by granting multicultural group 
rights to retain cultural practices that can oppress women. According to these 
feminists, doing so reinforces unequal power relations between men and women 
within Muslim families and communities. The feminist lens has made it possible to 
rethink the common belief that multiculturalism is a liberating and progressive 
mechanism for all members of minority groups and points to the continuing existence 
of inequality within them.  
In order to draw out issues of gender and culture central to feminist literature on 
multiculturalism, my own study relies heavily on Susan Okin‟s, Is Multiculturalism 
Bad for Women?, as the contestation over her arguments are indicative of much of the 
feminist debate. In the mid-1990s, Okin argued that granting rights to immigrants to 
retain their cultural identity disregarded the existence of patriarchal aspects of their 
culture and thus undermined the dignity of women and their universal human rights.
1 
Okin stated that it might be better if these cultures “become extinct” so women could 
integrate into a less patriarchal culture, rather than being conceded rights that allow 
the continuation of their oppression.
2
 Some strongly agreed with Okin, such as Katha 
Pollitt, who wrote, “I‟ve had a hard time understanding how anyone could find these 
arguments controversial.”3 Saskia Sassen concurred that in most cultures women are 
in a disadvantaged position, and thus “group rights” can run counter to improving 
gender equality.
4
 Even Kymlicka, whom Okin describes as “the foremost 
                                                             
1
 Susan Okin, ed., Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1999), 17-20. 
2 Ibid., 22-3. 
3 Katha Pollitt, “Whose Culture?” in Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, ed. Susan Okin (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), 27. 
4 However, Sassen emphasizes the risk of making “gender” the central issue in multicultural group 
rights when all members of a minority, not only women and children, but also men feel oppressed by 
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contemporary defender of cultural group rights,” agreed, in part, with Okin‟s 
arguments and conceded that it is necessary to pay attention to instances of injustice 
not only between majority and minority groups but also within groups.
5
  
However, the critique of multiculturalism made by Okin and her followers has also 
engendered strong responses from feminists of faith. Azizah Y. Al-hibri asserts that 
Okin‟s arguments are based on a conflation of culture and religion, and she criticizes 
Okin for using the two as if they are interchangeable.
6
 Al-hibri has also problematized 
applying a universalized Western secular feminism view to all women, and argued 
that Western secular feminists who do so are paradoxically being “patriarchal” 
towards women of faith and repeating the history of “colonialism, imperialism, or 
even fascism.”7 Further, Nurah W. Ammat‟ullah argues that some women, who carry 
out cultural practices described as oppressive by secular feminists, such as wearing 
the hijab, choose to do so of their own volition based on their beliefs. Ammat‟ullah‟s 
argument reflects contradictions within the orthodoxy of feminist critiques of 
multiculturalism: belief in the liberty of every individual to be treated with dignity 
potentially ignores women of faith who have chosen to live in a religiously observant 
way.
8
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
the mainstream. She adds that oppression can be so severe that it strengthens solidarity among men, 
women and children within minority groups. Thus, rather than rejecting multicultural group rights per 
se, Sassen proposed to negotiate ways to deal with both intracultural gender inequality and intercultural 
oppression. See Saskia Sassen, “Culture beyond Gender,” in Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, ed. 
Susan Okin (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), 77-78. 
5 Will Kymlicka, “Liberal Complacencies,” in Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, ed. Susan Okin 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), 31; Kymlicka clarified his support for multicultural 
group rights by differentiating two types of cultural rights: the first based on claims of members for 
rights that could undermine and restrict other members‟ rights and liberty, which he opposed, and the 
second, such as language rights and land claims, directed against the larger society which he firmly 
defended. Kymlicka later also attempted to refute the liberal egalitarian argument that multicultural 
group rights undermine individual rights, and argued that such rights actually expand the choice of 
individuals by promoting equality and removing barriers and contesting stigma that disadvantage 
minorities. See Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, ed., Multiculturalism and the Welfare State (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 2. 
6
 Azizah Y. Al-hibri, “Is Western Patriarchal Feminism Good for Third World/Minority Women?” in Is 
Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, ed. Susan Okin  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), 
43-5. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Nurah W. Ammat‟ullah, “Making the Distinction between Faith and Religion: A Challenge to Secular 
Feminism,” in Feminism and Multiculturalism: How Do They/We Work Together, ed. Joyce W. 
Warren (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2006), 9-10. 
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Some feminist scholars have expanded upon Okin‟s arguments, and have suggested 
ways to resolve the conflict between cultural rights and gender equality. Shachar 
believes that it is possible to enhance both justice between majority and minority 
groups and gender equality for women by recognizing women‟s plural affiliations to 
both the state as a citizen and to their in-group.
9
 She further suggests that instead of 
having state-led hierarchical governance, a new legal-institutional system of “joint 
governance,” which recognizes multiple governance agents and shares authority 
between them, can more flexibly and creatively accommodate cultural groups without 
compromising the rights of their female members.
10
 Anne Phillips has expressed 
concern about the current trend in which principles of gender equality are used to 
demonize minority groups and to attack multiculturalism. Phillips does not consider 
that the issue of gender inequality within minority groups is a sufficient reason to 
abandon multiculturalism, and proposes a new framework that enables feminism and 
multiculturalism to work together.
11
 As the title of her book Multiculturalism without 
Culture indicates, she suggests keeping multiculturalism, but replacing the current 
focus on “essentialised and stereotyped cultures” with an emphasis on “individuals.”12 
Sarah Song made an important contribution to these feminist efforts of reconciling the 
conflict by pointing out the fact that many feminist analyses of multiculturalism (most 
notably that of Okin) are often based on essentialized views of the majority and 
minority cultures.
13
 Song argues that this dichotomization prevents feminist scholars 
from realizing “interactions” between these cultures and that patriarchy within 
minority groups is, in fact, often supported by patriarchy within the majority group in 
the process toward assimilation. Therefore she asserts that realizing the interactive 
and interdependent characteristics of different cultures, and having intercultural 
dialogue and deliberation (instead of merely accusing minority cultures of being 
patriarchal), is necessary to resolve the conflict between cultural rights and gender 
equality.
14
 
                                                             
9 Ayelet Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women's Rights (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 88-9. 
10 Ibid.  
11 Anne Phillips, Multiculturalism without Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 3. 
12 Ibid., 162. 
13 Sarah Song, Justice, Gender, and the Politics of Multiculturalism (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), 4-8. 
14 Ibid. 
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In summation, prominent feminist scholars‟ critiques of multiculturalism have 
focused on the possibility of women‟s rights being undermined, but have tended 
(relatively) to neglect investigation of the nation-building purpose to multiculturalism, 
and the gendered implications that nation-building itself may have. Furthermore, the 
current feminist literature on multiculturalism falters in not taking into consideration 
the unique aspects of the extensiveness and progressiveness of each society‟s 
multiculturalism. Indeed, Okin has admitted that despite difficulty in pinning down a 
precise definition – as she writes, a multicultural society should be seen as one that 
claims “that minority cultures…should…be protected through special group rights or 
privileges.”15 Thus it seems that the standard feminist critiques of multiculturalism are 
based on a pluralist form of multiculturalism that intends to accommodate minority 
cultural groups without inducing or forcing them to change in order to fit better into 
majority culture(s).  
That this style of feminist critique is standard highlights the necessity of my study. 
Compared to “strong” multicultural societies, such as Australia and Canada, in which 
these studies are overwhelmingly set, other countries have a more assimilationist form 
of multiculturalism. In Korea, the pattern of immigrants arriving individually and 
forming families with local people contributes to assimilation, and the concept of 
multicultural group rights does not exist. Therefore the feminist critiques discussed 
above are of limited relevance to Korean multiculturalism. This gap in the existing 
literature offers an opportunity to expand the feminist understanding of 
multiculturalism in contexts differing from those that have predominantly been 
studied so far.  
In the process of expanding the scope of feminist literature on multiculturalism, I will 
draw on existing studies on Korean multiculturalism that take local contexts into 
consideration. In recent years, the literature on Korean multiculturalism has rapidly 
expanded. Within a relatively short period of time, the literature has diversified in 
terms of content and become more sophisticated in applying quantitative, qualitative 
and comparative approaches.
16
 The literature now includes studies that analyze 
                                                             
15 Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, 10-11. 
16 Timothy Lim, in “Who is Korean? Migration, Immigration, and the Challenge of Multiculturalism in 
Homogeneous Societies,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, http://japanfocus.org/-Timothy-
Lim/3192 (March 16, 2011), and  James S. Frideres and Andrew Eungi Kim, in “A Multicultural 
Landscape and Multiculturalism of Canada: Implications for Korea,” Korea Observer 41, no. 4 (2010): 
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Korean multiculturalism with a focus, variously, on citizenship, different minority 
groups, and the role of central and local government in developing and implementing 
policies related to foreign residents.  
Although it has become difficult to pin down the core of literature on Korean 
multiculturalism, the concept of nation has remained central. Given that Korean 
multiculturalism at present is not so much about rights of minorities or their claims 
for multicultural group rights and national belonging, it is not surprising that the 
literature concentrates on Korea‟s rapid multicultural transformation as a nation. The 
focus on nation also arises because the Korean government, the most significant agent 
driving Korea‟s move towards multiculturalism, primarily uses the term as part of the 
discourse of building a “world-class” nation in which the roles of female marriage 
migrants and their “multicultural families” are emphasized. Here “multicultural 
family (damunhwa gajok)” is an official term for families consisting of a Korean 
citizen, a marriage migrant (overwhelmingly female) and their offspring, who are 
termed “multicultural children (damunhwa janyeo).”17   
Since in Korea the current multicultural nation-building project requires assimilation, 
these women‟s pre-existing cultural identity is often effaced. Female marriage 
migrants are encouraged by the government to become idealized Korean wives, 
mothers and daughters-in-law who are given the important task of maintaining 
traditional Korean family and culture, as “modernized” Korean women increasingly 
refuse to perform these roles.
18
 Ji-eun Kim argues that these women are required to 
prove to their Korean family members and the government in their everyday life that 
they have mastered the skills of being “Korean” in order to be considered a legitimate 
member of their families, and the nation.
19
 Therefore the rights of female marriage 
migrants largely depend on how well they perform the roles assigned to them. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
677-98,  have compared South Korean multiculturalism and multiculturalism with Western democratic 
societies, such as Australia and Canada.  
17 Hyun Mee Kim, “Multicultural Discourse and Policy in Korean Society” (paper presented at the 
2008 Jeju Human Rights Conference, Jeju, June 26-29, 2008), 321-2. 
18 Kyoung-Hee Moon, “Analysis of „the Crisis of Multiculturalism‟ in Europe and Korean 
Multicultural Policies: Focusing on Policies for Female Migrants” (paper presented at the 2011 
Association for Korean Studies in Europe Conference, Moscow State University, June 17-20, 2011).  
19 Ji-eun Kim, “The Making of “the Korean Wife”: The Institutionalization of Marriage Migration in 
the Cases of Vietnamese Women,” Seoul National University Cross-Cultural Studies 13, no. 2 (2007): 
43. 
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Kyeong-hee Moon argues that current government policies treat female marriage 
migrants as “dependent receivers of caring support.”20 According to Moon, the fact 
that the government provides female marriage migrants with support and services 
regardless of their desires or needs indicates that current policies are designed 
primarily to meet the desires and needs of the government instead. For example, the 
Korean government has emphasized “unity of society” and the quick adaptations of 
female marriage migrants and their children to this unity in the Support for 
Multicultural Families Act.
21
 As Moon argues, riots and terrorist attacks carried out in 
European countries by members of minority groups have influenced Korean 
government policies on immigrants and their children.
22
 Her study indicates that the 
Korean government, concerned about potential social conflicts, is trying to prevent 
them through helping immigrants to become integrated and assimilated to Korean 
society. Indeed, the lack of voice of female marriage migrants has enabled the 
government to design policies that meet its own purposes.  
Furthermore, Hui-Jung Kim argues that the government primarily views female 
marriage migrants as biological and cultural reproducers of the Korean nation in the 
midst of the multicultural transformation that surrounds them.
23
 According to Kim, in 
modern history, the Korean state has strategically intervened in the bodies of Korean 
women at various points through anti-natalist and pro-natalist policies for the purpose 
of the country‟s economic development. In the mid- to late 20th century, Korean 
women were encouraged to contribute to the country‟s economic development by 
having no more than two children.
 
Conversely, since 2005, when the country‟s total 
fertility rate reached record lows (only 1.08 children born per woman), far below the 
replacement rate (2.1), women have been encouraged to have more children to rescue 
their nation from being overwhelmed by the crisis of a low birth rate and an ageing 
population. Against this historical background, it can be argued that the government 
sees not only Korean women, but also female marriage migrants as valuable 
                                                             
20 Moon, “Analysis of „the Crisis of Multiculturalism‟ in Europe and Korean Multicultural Policies: 
Focusing on Policies for Female Migrants.”  
21
 Ministry of Government Legislation, Republic of Korea, “Support for Multicultural Families Act,” 
accessed January 15, 2012, http://www.moleg.go.kr.  
22 Moon, “Analysis of „the Crisis of Multiculturalism‟ in Europe and Korean Multicultural Policies: 
Focusing on Policies for Female Migrants.”  
23 Hui-Jung Kim, “Marriage Migration and Changing Gender-Nation Relations in South Korea” (paper 
presented at the Pacific World in Motion, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada, 
March 13-15, 2008), accessed July 31, 2011, http://ssc.wisc.edu/sscc/.  
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biological reproducers of and for the Korean nation. In addition, Kim argues that 
female marriage migrants are expected to take on the role of transmitting Korean 
culture to their children.
 
The assimilationist policies of the Korean government are 
intended to help female marriage migrants become “Korean” mothers; thereby they 
can raise their offspring as “Korean.” 24 
However, Kim‟s argument neglects the aspects of the government‟s multiculturalism 
that are more ambivalent toward the definition of “Koreanness,” for example their 
intention to educate the children of marriage migrants as multicultural through 
cultivating both their bilingual language skills and bicultural background, so that they 
can become valuable assets for the country. President Lee has emphasized the need to 
increase national competitiveness by using multicultural children who are considered 
to have cultural sensitivity for both parents‟ countries and speak the languages of both 
countries fluently.
25
 Therefore as long as multicultural children do not cause social 
problems and do contribute to national development, being multicultural in a more 
pluralist sense seems not merely tolerated but encouraged by the government in some 
ways. However, the centrality of nation-building to Korean multiculturalism remains 
consistent.  
In short, the implementation of multicultural policies in some culturally diverse 
societies has been intertwined with the notion of nation and the reconstruction of the 
nation under a multicultural framework. Thus it is important for scholars writing on 
multiculturalism to take account of this nation-building purpose. In particular, 
feminist analyses on Korean multiculturalism present valuable insights into gendered 
aspects of multiculturalism by showing how female marriage migrants are primarily 
viewed and treated by the Korean government as “uniform objects” to meet its nation-
building purposes.
26
 However, these analyses exist separately from the Western 
feminist literature on multiculturalism that has been largely based on case studies of 
Western societies. In this study, by introducing the gendered aspects of 
multiculturalism in the more assimilationist framework of Korea‟s version of a 
multicultural society, I hope to expand the scope of such literature. In doing so, I also 
                                                             
24 Kim, “Marriage Migration and Changing Gender-Nation Relations in South Korea.” 
25 KTV (Government Broadcasting Service), “President Lee 44th Radio & Internet Speech,” accessed 
April 10, 2012, http://www.ktv.go.kr.  
26 Hyun Mee Kim, “The State and Migrant Women: Diverging Hopes in the Making of „Multicultural 
Families‟ in Contemporary Korea,” Korea Journal 47, no. 4 (2007): 105. 
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hope to contribute to feminist understandings of different types of multiculturalism, 
and to highlight the core purpose of multiculturalism: nation-building. 
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Chapter Two: Gendered Nation and Culture; Research Design 
 
Before I elaborate upon the gendered aspects of multicultural nation-building in 
Korea, it is necessary to lay out feminist theories of nation and culture. In this chapter, 
I focus on ways in which patriarchy is embodied within nation and culture and 
explain the theoretical framework of this thesis.  
The term patriarchy, in general, is used to indicate the subordination of women to 
men, and also the subordination of younger people to older people.
1
 This generalized 
understanding and use of the notion of patriarchy has been criticized by some feminist 
scholars for ignoring different forms of patriarchy, and for being essentialist and 
ahistorical.
2
 It also ignores the fact that patriarchy can be experienced differently by 
people (especially women) according to their class and ethnicity. These critiques 
reveal useful insights into the shortcomings of the generalized use of the notion of 
patriarchy. However, in this chapter, I do not intend to debate the notion of patriarchy 
itself, but instead to introduce the way in which nation-building can be gendered, by 
examining the embodiment of patriarchy in the course of nation-building projects in 
both monocultural and bi/multicultural nations. Thus this more generalized meaning 
of patriarchy becomes sufficient and even pragmatic for my immediate purposes.  
In Chapters Three and Four, my empirical study of female marriage migrants in the 
Korean multicultural nation-building project will illustrate a localized and historically 
contextualized patriarchy. At the end of this chapter, I outline the research design and 
methods that I have used for that empirical study.  
 
Gender & Nation 
Anne McClintock, a prominent feminist scholar, provides a concise description of 
nations as offering the: “sanctioned institutionalization of gender differences [italics 
in original].”3 Among feminist scholars who have studied the confluence of gender, 
                                                             
1 Sylvia Walby, Theorizing Patriarchy (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1990), 2.  
2 Ibid.; Nira Yuval-Davis, Gender & Nation (London: SAGE Publications, 1997), 7. 
3 Anne McClintock, “Family Feuds: Gender, Nationalism and the Family,” Feminist Review, no. 44 
(1993): 61. 
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family, patriarchy, and nation since the late 20
th
 century, I have been particularly 
influenced by Nira Yuval-Davis, Floya Anthias, Tamar Mayer, Anne McClintock and 
Patricia Hill Collins.
4
  Yuval-Davis and Anthias enumerate five major ways in which 
women are implicated within the nation: 1) as biological reproducers of members of 
national collectivities; 2) as ideological reproducers and cultural carriers of the nation; 
3) as markers of the boundaries of national groups (by preventing women from having 
sexual or marital relationships with men from other groups); 4) as signifiers of 
national differences; and 5) as active participants in national struggles.
5
 The first three 
major ways in which women are implicated in the nation are particularly relevant to 
my empirical study, and I therefore expand upon each of them.    
The first role of women as biological reproducers is crucial for the very existence of a 
nation. Obviously without members, the nation cannot exist, let alone survive. 
Women become responsible for bearing these members. Of course, men are part of 
the reproductive process too, but as Yuval-Davis points out, in many cases, women 
(rather than men) have been used and constructed by states as “captive” targets in 
order to meet the purpose of nation-building and controlling the population.
6
 In 
addition, Yuval-Davis identifies three main discourses in relation to population 
control: the discourse of “people as power,” furthering national interest through 
enlarging the population; a Malthusian discourse, encouraging women to have fewer 
children especially in developing countries (e.g. China‟s one child policy); and a 
eugenicist discourse that considers the “quality” of the population to be more 
important than “size” and chooses particular groups of women to have more children 
and others to have fewer.
7
 In recent years, this role of women as biological 
reproducers has been strongly emphasized in some countries, especially in Asia where 
low birth rates and the consequent ageing of the population have been perceived to 
threaten the nation, as in South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Singapore. Turner argues 
that this issue of low birth rate and ageing population has led the government of these 
                                                             
4 See also Jacqueline Stevens, Reproducing the State (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1999); 
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countries to intervene actively in matters of the private sphere in order to secure a 
sustainable national population.
8
  
Scholars argue that this state use of women as biological reproducers of the nation is 
problematic, because the government hopes to control women‟s sexuality and breach 
the reproductive rights of the individual (to decide whether to have a child, and if so, 
when and how many) by intervening into the bodies of women with a justification to 
secure national reproduction, and ultimately the nation per se.
9
 In addition, a 
predestined role for women as biological reproducers has potential to undermine their 
rights if they fail to produce a child. According to Turner, providing reproductive 
service (i.e. birth, maintenance and socialization of offspring) is often viewed as the 
defining characteristic of the responsible citizen in the liberal regime of modern 
citizenship, particularly in countries that are experiencing a low birth rate and ageing 
population.
10
 Turner‟s suggestion seems particularly applicable in the case of 
foreigners (especially female) who marry into one of these nations. In most cases, 
citizenship is given upon birth (by jus soli and/or jus sanguinis), but these female 
foreigners need to earn citizenship in their new countries. Providing reproductive 
service to their adopted country is often a central means for these women to obtain 
citizenship and thereby enhance their rights. If they fail to bear children, they may 
experience difficulties in obtaining citizenship. 
Women, moreover, are viewed not only as biological reproducers, but also as cultural 
reproducers of the nation. Even though in some parts of the world, the participation of 
fathers in parenting has increased, in many others, mothers are still considered the key 
transmitters of culture to children,
11
 for reasons that should be understood in relation 
to the patriarchal dichotomy regarding gender roles: men perform privileged tasks in 
the public sphere and women perform undervalued tasks in the private sphere. 
Cultural education for children is primarily delivered within the private sphere since 
many core elements of a nation‟s culture, such as food, dress and language are 
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10 Turner, “Citizenship, Reproduction and the State: International Marriage and Human Rights,” 47. 
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Citizenship, ed. Rodolfo D. Torres, Louis F. Mirón, and Jonathan Zavier Inda (Massachusetts: 
Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1999), 115. 
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practiced and preserved in domestic space. Thus it is not surprising that responsibility 
for educating to children falls mainly on women, whose primary responsibility is 
thought to be in the private sphere, where many cultural activities are carried out. 
Therefore, women are the nation‟s “social and biological womb(s).”12   
Furthermore, women are often seen as symbols of the nation.
13
 Women are given the 
burden of representing the nation, while men are given the burden of protecting this 
representation. Farwell argues sexually attacking (raping) women‟s bodies is 
commonly perceived as an attack on the nation, and a way to humiliate male members 
of the nation for failing to protect their women, and, ultimately, their nation.
14
 In other 
words, when men embody the nation, they do so as active defenders, and thus they are 
considered active citizens, but when women embody the nation, they do so as passive 
symbols or reproducers (“wombs”). This type of gendered division in the roles and 
responsibility of men and women in the nation-building process is not helpful in 
improving gender equality since the division restricts women from expanding their 
involvement in roles that are considered important, and often dominated by men. 
In short, feminist scholars have highlighted women‟s experiences and contributions in 
the process of nation-building projects, and they have provided insight into how the 
nation is primarily constructed in patriarchal terms. Here, I need to emphasize that 
these feminist analyses of the roles of women in the nation-building process suggest 
that women as well as men are active national agents, but that the female contribution 
has been devalued due to patriarchal social norms. In the following section, by using 
these feminist analyses of the embodiment of patriarchy in nation, I examine how 
patriarchy has been embodied in the Korean nation-building process.  
 
Patriarchal Nation-Building in Korea 
                                                             
12 Mayer, Gender Ironies of Nationalism: Sexing the Nation, 10. 
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According to Smith, myths regarding nationhood are crucial in a nation-building 
project, and in fact “shape” the nation.15 A gendered ideal of nation is often depicted 
in such myths, and members of the nation frequently cite such narratives in 
constituting and perpetuating their nation in their minds and deeds. Korea‟s creation 
myth, Dangunsinhwa (the Legend of Dangun),
16
 exemplifies the embodiment of 
patriarchy in the Korean nation. In this well-known tale, Hwanung, the son of the 
“Lord of Heaven,” comes to earth to make the human world better. A tiger and a bear 
come to beg him to transform them into humans. Hwanung promises to transform 
them if they endure the hardship of eating nothing but mugwort and garlic and not 
seeing the sun for a hundred days. The tiger gives up and runs away, but the bear 
patiently carries on the task, and finally become a woman. From the union of this 
woman and Hwanung, a son, Dangun, is born. Although virtually no one takes this 
story literally, a figure named Dangun is regularly treated as the founder of the first 
Korean kingdom, Gojoseon (BC2333 – BC108), and, more importantly, as the 
biological ancestor of Koreans.
17
 In this myth, women originate from an animal and 
men originate from a savior from Heaven. Hwanung is depicted as a hero who saves 
the human world (male supremacy and heroism are evident), but the woman is only 
depicted as a child-bearer. This myth also indicates that patience, endurance, 
persistence and self-control are crucial qualifications and requirements for women to 
bear a son, and describes desirable characteristics and roles for women that are central 
to the nation-building process in Korea.  
The dichotomy between roles for men as active defenders of the nation and women as 
passive reproducers has been especially visible in the nation-building process since 
Korea‟s independence from Japanese Occupation (1910-1945). It seems that the 
brutal history of being colonized by the Japanese, the division of the peninsula, and 
the on-going military tension between North and South since the Korean War (1950-
1953, the fighting was largely confined to this period, the war itself has never 
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officially ended) have strengthened the roles of men as active defenders of the 
nation.
18
  The image of women as exclusively passive reproducers of the nation has 
been reflected in anti-natal or pro-natal policies, which have been used by the Korean 
government depending on perceived needs at specific times in order to mobilize 
women to contribute to the country‟s development.19  
From this, it is evident that Korean women‟s bodies are consistently used by the 
government as instruments for nation-building. For example, during the mid- to late 
20
th
 century after the Korean War and under the military dictatorship, more than one 
million poor Korean women in US military camptowns (gijichon) were expected by 
the Korean government to perform as “sex ambassadors” for the purpose of 
improving diplomatic ties with the US for national security and economic growth 
through selling sex to US soldiers.
20
 A group of ex-prostitutes from these camptowns 
have claimed that although the government did not use coercive means, it encouraged 
them to sell sex by providing them with basic English and etiquette classes, and by 
praising them as “dollar-earning patriots.” 21  The Ministry of Gender Equality & 
Family has declined to confirm these women‟s claims, but it is widely recognized that 
the government has tolerated prostitution around US bases although it is illegal in 
Korea. In addition, transcripts of parliamentary hearings from the 1960s support these 
women‟s claims that some law makers viewed prostitution as a way of earning dollars, 
and urged the government to supply prostitutes for US soldiers, and the then deputy 
home minister responded that the government had improved the supply of prostitutes 
around US bases.
22
    
Korean and American soldiers who fought against a mutual Communist enemy in the 
early 1950s and have defended South Korea since then, have been remembered and 
frequently praised in ceremonies and events, however these women‟s contributions, 
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and their hardships in enduring violence and injustice, have been considered by the 
public, and government, as unimportant and even shameful in patriarchal Neo-
Confucian Korean society.
23
  
Thus, these Korean women were not only viewed as instruments by the government 
for a national purpose, but they have regularly been perceived by many Koreans as 
being “tainted” symbols of the nation. 24  Mixed-blood children who were born 
between these Korean women and American soldiers have been discriminated against 
in Korean society, in part because they have a mother who “sold her body” to US 
soldiers.
25
 Such children are seen as a reminder of the Korean women who were 
considered to have put Korean men to “shame” and “betray[ed]” their nation by 
having sex with a US soldier.
26
 This perception is a clear example of Korean women‟s 
bodies as symbols of the nation, in this instance a nation that had been occupied by 
the US imperial power. Their representation, rather than serving the needs and 
experiences of the women in question, serves instead as a shameful reminder for 
Korean men in their failure of protecting (or taking control of) women‟s bodies, and 
thus the nation.  
In addition, women in Korea are expected to function as cultural reproducers of the 
nation. In spite of increasing awareness of gender equality, the predestined role of 
women as mothers remains strongly emphasized. In fact, mothers continue to be in 
charge of most chores involved in raising children regardless of whether they have a 
job outside the home or not.
27
 An ongoing emphasis on domestic labor was 
underscored in 2009, when the Bank of Korea decided to choose Shin Saimdang as 
the first woman to appear on a Korean banknote. Shin Saimdang (1504-1551) is well-
known not only for being a great artist, but also for symbolizing the ideal Korean 
mother in raising her son Yulgok, one of Korea‟s greatest Confucian scholars. When 
the bank announced its decision, a few feminists denounced it, stating that choosing 
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Shin Saimdang stereotyped women as mothers, and glorified Confucian patriarchy.
28
 
In addition, these feminists also argued that choosing Shin Saimdang, who succeeded 
in both in her profession and in performing the traditional functions of women in the 
private sphere, the bank was implicitly justifying women‟s self-sacrifice, especially 
the “double-shift” of work that many women are forced to take on.29 These feminists 
urged the Bank of Korea to choose another woman, such as Ryu Gwan-Sun, who is 
well known for fighting for the country‟s independence during the March 1st 
Movement against Japanese colonial rule,
30
 but their criticisms went largely unheard, 
due to public lack of awareness and/or interest in the gendered implications of 
choosing Shin Saimdang as a representative figure for Korean women.  
To sum up, in the nation-building process, Korean women are symbolic figures who 
are expected to stay in the private sphere, protected by men, and to take on roles 
associated with activities that occur in this sphere (i.e. as biological and cultural 
reproducers of the nation). By limiting women‟s roles thusly, women are relegated to 
the position of secondary citizens of the nation. In this way, the Korean nation-
building has been essentially patriarchal. Although the necessity of reproduction for 
nation-building makes it a political act, patriarchy consigns reproduction and family 
to the private sphere, thereby labeling them as less important.  
Consequently, that the feminist analyses discussed in the beginning of this chapter 
made a ground-breaking contribution to the literature of nationhood is both evident 
and understandable. Feminist analyses focus on the particular ways in which 
patriarchy determines different roles for men and women, and the relegation of 
women to a secondary position in national citizenship as a result. However, these 
feminist analyses of nationhood disregard the embodiment of patriarchy within 
culture, which is a fundamental element to nation-building. The feminist scholars of 
multiculturalism whom I introduced in the previous chapter provide insights into the 
patriarchal nature of cultures; thus their views on the relation between gender and 
culture bridge the gap exists in the feminist literature on nationhood.  
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Gender & Culture  
 
A sense of having shared culture (often a homogenized and idealized culture) among 
members of a nation is a key element for the existence and unity of the nation, as 
Anderson argues. Culture enables the members of a nation to identify themselves 
collectively. In other words, it grounds nationalism. This collective identity based on 
shared culture is so important that Gellner has even famously said “nationalism is not 
the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not 
exist.”31 In the previous sections of this chapter, I argued that nations are patriarchal 
by examining ways in which nation-building is carried out based on patriarchal norms 
and practices. In this section, I am going to flesh out the framework I have established 
in that argument by considering culture as a fundamental element of nation, and 
discussing the patriarchal aspects of culture.  
In her critique of the granting of multicultural group rights to minority groups, Okin 
has problematized the acceptance of cultures that embody patriarchy within them. 
While Okin‟s work tends to problematic generalization, her supposition that “most” 
cultures are patriarchal, and therefore “antifeminist” and oppressive for women, is 
relevant to my work here.
32
 As Okin argues, the relationship between patriarchy and 
culture exists because men, who have more social and physical power, have had the 
authority to determine how cultures are articulated and constructed, and also because 
culture has been used by men to facilitate their control over women.
33
 Controversial 
customs oppressive to women, such as types of violence related to “honor” (including 
honor killings, victims of rape being forced to marry their rapist in order to protect 
family honor), female genital mutilation, forced marriage, and polygamy are often 
described as “cultural” practices. These practices control women and favor men‟s 
interests. Of course, patriarchal cultural practices do not have to be as extreme as the 
above examples. Restricting women to performing their roles as wives and mothers at 
home can also be considered patriarchal, and thus oppressive.  
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Furthermore, feminist scholars in writing on the relationship of multiculturalism to 
the private sphere have provided insight. In particular, feminist scholars have 
scrutinized the ways in which the private sphere can function as a haven for 
immigrant families in Western societies to deliver culturally endorsed practices that 
are often oppressive to women.
34
 In recent decades, awareness of gender inequality 
has increased in many countries, and policy measures have been implemented to 
improve the situation in the public sphere. However, because the private sphere is 
often assumed to be based on romantic and intimate relationships, or because gender 
inequality within this sphere is considered a private issue not subject to public 
intervention, it has, in general, received less attention. These stereotypical perceptions 
have contributed to the survival of patriarchy in the private sphere. Collins argues that, 
contrary to the conventional belief in that the private sphere is based on romantic and 
other affective bonds, it is, in fact, constructed around hierarchical relationships 
among family members, most notably between husbands and wives.
35
 Family is 
particularly important in relation to the nation and gender because family is often 
thought as “natural” and such hierarchies become naturalized in turn. Individuals 
internalize naturalized hierarchical relationships from the private sphere, and this 
contributes to the assumption that men and women should occupy those same 
hierarchical positions within the nation.
36
 Therefore, McClintock argues that nations 
embody the “iconography of familial and domestic space.”37 McClintock‟s argument 
is clearly demonstrated in my previous discussion of normative Korean gender roles.  
To sum up, patriarchy is embedded in both culture and nation. Culture, which in the 
context of my thesis a set of ideas, values and practices that have been created within 
a patriarchal system, grounds a nation-building process. The patriarchy within culture 
and nation is constructed and naturalized in the private sphere, propagated through 
family relationships, and is expanded as people interact with each other outside the 
private sphere based upon patriarchal norms that they have learnt within it. In this 
sense, a nation is a naturalized and legitimized system of patriarchy. Using this 
synthesis of patriarchy and nation, gender norms and culture, I will examine the use 
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of female marriage migrants by the Korean government as central means for its 
patriarchal nation-building project, within a multicultural framework.  
 
Research Design 
Analyzing the nation-building purpose that underlies the Korean government‟s 
multicultural family policies is at the core of this study, and it is appropriate to here 
lay out the methods I have used to gather this information, which I shall then interpret 
through the feminist framework that I outlined immediately above.  
I collected necessary data for analysis from both primary and secondary sources, by 
referring to existing literature and government official documents, and by conducting 
interviews with stakeholders. I have analyzed the purposes of government policies 
largely based on primary sources rather than secondary sources, and referred to 
literature on Korean multiculturalism mainly to understand the different ways in 
which government policies for female marriage migrants and their multicultural 
families have been analyzed. I have borrowed some of their ideas to support my 
arguments, but I have tried to develop my analysis based on primary sources. Two 
reasons for using primary sources are to deliver a clear description of the policies 
themselves, and also to obtain up-to-date information that existing studies do not 
cover. The key sources I refer to are official government documents and 
pronouncements, research reports commissioned by the government, and media and 
NGO reports written in response to government policies.
38
 
Nevertheless, merely looking into documents was insufficient for understanding 
delivery of the policies in practice, such as routes of delivery, and the attitudes of 
people who handle the policies. I therefore conducted interviews with stakeholders 
during field research.
39
 I selected two different groups of interviewees in order to 
canvas a range of perspectives on government policies. Particularly, social workers 
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from Multicultural Family Support Centers (henceforth MFSCs), who are hired by the 
government and working according to the government guidelines, and independent 
NGO workers who work for female marriage migrants or other foreign residents.  
As most of the MFSC programs and services are designed by the central government, 
and the MFSCs around the country are similar in their programs and services, I 
limited my research area to South Gyeongsang Province. Choosing this area was 
useful to my work because it has MFSCs in both urban and rural areas and this dual 
placement enabled me to take into consideration the different socioeconomic 
conditions of the two environments. Likewise, I conducted interviews with NGO 
workers based in this same region. In addition, I interviewed two NGO workers based 
in the capital region of Seoul. In total, I visited three MFSCs and interviewed five 
MFSC workers and six NGO workers. What I observed and heard, especially in my 
visits to MFSCs and NGO offices, is reflected in my analysis.  
Overall the interviews were semi-structured (see Appendix 1 and 2 for lists of 
interviewees and interview questions). I had specific questions about interviewees‟ 
opinions regarding government policies. However, during the interview process, other 
questions arose naturally. After the interviews, I transcribed them in Korean. I sent 
transcripts to those quoted in this study. Feedback has been given as a summary or a 
full draft of this thesis either in English or Korean (or both) depending on the 
interviewee‟s wishes. 
In order to fully explore my case study, I also employ qualitative methods, thematic 
analysis and discourse analysis, because of the descriptive and conceptual nature of 
the questions that I raise. As I discussed in my introduction, I am concerned with 
asking and answering three particular questions: 1) to what extent does the Korean 
government give more preferential treatment to female marriage migrants than other 
categories of foreigners?; 2) what is the purpose of such treatment on the part of the 
government?; and finally, 3) what implications does my study on the preferential 
treatment of migrant women have for feminist critiques of multiculturalism? I use 
thematic analysis in categorizing my data into these different themes, and discourse 
analysis in deconstructing government policies to reveal the motivations and beliefs 
that underlie them. I further categorize the data in relation to the main social issues 
that the country has faced in recent years, such as issues of discrimination against and 
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abuse of foreign residents, weakening of family loyalty and traditional culture, rural 
depopulation and decline, and the low birth rate and ageing of society. One aspect that 
all these issues share is their profound influence upon nation-building.  
Additionally, I employ qualitative analysis to examine multicultural policy for both its 
explicit and implicit purposes. The explicit purpose is that acknowledged by the 
government: to facilitate the adaptation of female marriage migrants into Korean 
family and society, to stabilize multicultural families, and to increase national 
competitiveness in the global arena. The implicit purpose is not laid out in the policies 
but is argued by scholars and stakeholders. One of the most prominent arguments is 
that the implicit purpose of multicultural policy is to mobilize female marriage 
migrants in increasing the national birth rate, and raising their children as capable 
members of the Korean nation. In the following pages, I will investigate this claim, 
and I will deconstruct the government‟s views on and attitudes towards female 
marriage migrants and social issues. In the course of doing so, I reveal connections 
between social issues and multicultural policy, and re-interpret the purposes of those 
policies in relation to nation-building. In short, by using qualitative data and methods, 
I investigate the purpose and motivations of Korean government policies designed for 
female marriage migrants and their multicultural families.  
I have referred to material written in both Korean and English in this thesis, and 
translated some Korean material into English. All Korean government official 
documents are originally written in Korean, but the government provides English 
translation for some documents. However, I have mainly referred to the original 
Korean documents, and translated them as literally as possible at the cost of creating, 
in some parts, rather unnatural English. I did so because I found that some 
government translations distort the original meaning and intention of the policies. 
More importantly, English translations of documents are not official, and thus lack 
legal status. In the bibliography I provide an English translation for the details of all 
Korean references that I have used in this study.  
Finally, it is necessary to acknowledge my positionality as a researcher in this project. 
Ackerly and True argue that in “feminist-informed” research, it is important and 
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ethical to be attentive to one‟s own situatedness as a researcher.40 This is because each 
researcher has different epistemology and belief systems, which inevitably play an 
important role in all phases of their research. I was born and grew up in South Korea, 
where I lived under patriarchal family and cultural norms and systems. However, for 
the past decade, I have lived in other countries, including the UK, Mexico and New 
Zealand. My experience of living as an immigrant in a foreign country has boosted 
my interest in multiculturalism, and enabled me to think critically about its meaning 
and its different manifestations. In addition, my time living outside of Korea has also 
enabled me to think more clearly about Korea‟s nationalism and patriarchal family 
and social structure.  
I came to live in New Zealand in 2009, and have lived in the country since then. My 
purpose of moving to New Zealand was mainly because of my relationship with a 
New Zealander whom I met in Mexico. Even though I am not married to him, I share 
some similarities with female marriage migrants in Korea who entered Korea based 
on their relationship with a Korean man. Throughout this project, my experience of 
entering a New Zealand family and society has influenced my analysis of the Korean 
government‟s multicultural family policies. My position predisposes me to discuss the 
experiences of female marriage migrants and their views on multicultural family 
policies. However, I have decided not to include their experiences, but to focus 
instead on analyzing the ways in which the Korean government mobilizes these 
women for the purpose of nation-building. I am conscious of this decision as a 
potential limitation, and take responsibility for any shortcomings.  
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Chapter Three: The South Korean Context   
 
This chapter outlines the Korean context in which many female marriage migrants are 
situated. Korean society, in general, has been shaped by Neo-Confucianism, which 
upholds patriarchy as central to both family and society. However, recently, Korea 
has experienced significant changes, as a result of industrialization, modernization 
and globalization, which have weakened this patriarchal pillar as a result. These 
changes include a weakening of family ties and fidelity to traditional roles, especially 
reproductive and caregiving roles, a low birth rate and an ageing population, rural 
depopulation and decline, and the erosion of traditional Korean culture in general. 
Often these changes are framed by political leaders, and seen by many Koreans, as a 
“crisis” that threatens the nation.1  
Knowledge of not only these current historical and cultural contexts but also of the 
specific living environments of female marriage migrants is crucial for an 
understanding of the government mobilization of these women through multicultural 
family policies (Chapter Four). Of particular relevance is the usually lower 
socioeconomic status of the families of female marriage migrants and the strong 
presence of patriarchy within the families. Such environments facilitate government 
mobilization of female marriage migrants by providing a justification for government 
intervention into the private sphere.  
 
 
Historical and Cultural Context 
As mentioned above, since the late 20
th
 century, Korea has experienced significant 
social change as a consequence of the ongoing industrialization, modernization and 
globalization of the nation. Discourses of family “crisis” have been formulated as a 
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result of changes to the Korean family.
2
 The total number of divorce cases in the 
country increased roughly ten-fold between 1970 (11,615) and 2010 (116,858) while 
the total population grew only 1.5 times during the same years.
3
 The proportion of 
unmarried individuals between 25 and 29 has increased significantly, rising from 18% 
and 50% for women and men respectively in 1985 to 59% and 81% for men in 2005.
4
 
The average age of first marriage has likewise increased.
5
 The increasing proportion 
of unmarried individuals, along with the older average age for first marriage, directly 
impacts the Korean birth rate. In general, the fertility window for women narrows as 
they age, and the social stigma regarding cohabitation between unmarried couples, 
and out-of-wedlock births, has remained largely intact.
6
 Consequently, South Korea 
has one of the lowest birth rates in the world. According to the 2011 World Factbook, 
the total fertility rate of the country is 1.23 children born per woman, which ranked 
South Korea 217
th
 among 222 countries.
7
 Korea‟s fertility rate rebounded somewhat 
between 2005 and 2010, compared to its record low in 2005, due to the increasing 
entry of foreign brides in the mid-2000s (Chapter Four); however, it still remains well 
below replacement rate. Due to the country‟s low fertility rates, discourses of the 
family‟s crisis in performing its reproductive function have become pronounced.  
Furthermore, low fertility rates and increasing life expectancy as a result of the 
development of health technology have brought about the problem of an ageing 
population. The proportion of those aged over 65 is expected to increase to 38.2% of 
Korea‟s total population by 2050, a pace of societal ageing that some have noted is 
the fastest in the world.
8
 These demographic changes are expected to bring significant 
consequences, such as a decrease in working age population, and a worsening of the 
ratio between the dependent and productive part of the population. Any of this may 
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trigger social conflict between people of different generations, and increase pressure 
on the government to provide the elderly with pensions and caregiving services.
9
 
That the caregiving function of family, which is normally performed by female family 
members, is weakening has made the problem of ageing population even more urgent. 
In general, the world over, women are more likely than men to take on the role of 
caregiver, and Korean women are no exception. They are not only in charge of 
looking after their husband and children, but also their parents and parents-in-law. 
Traditionally, there is a strong expectation that married women serve their parents-in-
law faithfully. Disobeying parents-in-law was even considered to be one of the seven 
evils that dishonor women in Confucianism.
10
 However, with an increasing number of 
elderly Koreans living in households of one or two people, the tradition has weakened. 
As of 2005, 32% of the elderly population over 65 lived alone, and 34% lived with 
their spouse or other relatives.
11
 These rates are much higher than they were in 1990, 
when only 8% of the elderly population lived by themselves, and 16% lived only with 
their spouse or relatives; the majority lived with children and grandchildren.
12
   
The rapid increase of the elderly population, together with the fact that family ties are 
weakening, has increased public dependency upon the government provision of 
caregiving services. This has put considerable pressure on the Korean government. 
Particularly, after experiencing the severe economic crises of the late 1990s, and more 
recently of the late 2000s, public demand for a better welfare system has amplified, so 
much so that during the election of members to the National Assembly in 2012, even 
the conservative New Frontier Party (Saenuri-dang) had to pledge additional 
spending of $79 billion to expand welfare services.
13
 In a similar fashion, to respond 
to increasing public demand in 2003, the twin issues of low birth rate and ageing 
population were selected as one of the government‟s top agenda items. In 2005, the 
                                                             
9 See, e.g., Ik Ki Kim, “Policy Responses to Low Fertility and Population Ageing in Korea,” United 
Nations Secretariat, accessed November 19, 2011,  
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/popdecline/kim.pdf. 
10 Chern-Nee Chua, “Women‟s Self-sacrifice,” Korea Times, February 27, 2012.  
11 Statistics Korea, “Generational Composition of Family and Household Types of Senior Citizens 
Including Those Who Live Alone,” accessed May 26, 2012, http://www.index.go.kr.  
12 Ibid. 
13 John Power, “Has Populism Taken over Politics?” The Korea Herald, April 9, 2012.  
41 
 
Presidential Committee on Low Fertility and Ageing Society was formed.
14
 The 
Presidential Committee has developed policy measures to increase the country‟s birth 
rate through creating a “family-friendly” social environment. These measures include 
improving childcare facilities and encouraging people to take maternity leave, 
providing married couples with support for housing loans and childcare allowances, 
and giving tax incentives to families with multiple children.
15
 The government has 
also made efforts to provide the elderly with employment opportunities, and to 
strengthen the income support system for them.
16
 Overall, between 1990 and 2007, 
the government increased its welfare policy spending by 11% (on average) per year, 
taking the risk of worsening its debt-to-GDP ratio.
17
  
However, according to the OECD secretary general Angel Gurria, “Korea is not in a 
position to embark on outright welfare policies” because of its increasing debt. 18 
Gurria warns that the 11% annual increase in spending welfare policies is the highest 
among OECD countries, and emphasizes that the Korean government needs to be 
careful in this area specifically because of the country‟s ageing population, which 
alone could elevate social spending to 20% of GDP by 2050.
19
 Thus the government 
has faced a series of challenges: to alleviate the negative socioeconomic impacts 
caused by the low birth rate and ageing population; to meet the public needs for 
welfare services; and to balance its social spending on these services with the 
country‟s lower rate of economic growth.  
As a way to overcome these challenges, the government has attempted to restore 
weakened family values. The current administration has emphasized the restoration of 
traditional norms of loyalty. President Lee urged the nation to reinstate the Korean 
extended family system that differs from a “Western nuclear family,” praising the 
former by saying “the world [will] become more peaceful if the West learns from our 
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family system.”
20
 He also instituted a system of awards for people who have done 
their filial duty to parents (-in-law) in very difficult situations. Many of these prize-
winners were “good” daughters-in-law who had served their parents-in-law with 
devotion.
21
 Here, the President‟s definition of “the Korean family system” is one that 
maintains harmony through hierarchical relationships based on patriarchal norms. 
Restoring the idealized traditional family in order to overcome the family crisis seems 
a culturally appropriate approach, and also reduces the government‟s burden in 
providing welfare services. However, the breakdown of traditional systems, and 
governmental attempts to reconstitute them should not only be considered in relation 
to their impact upon social functions. It is also necessary to discuss the erosion of 
“idealized” Korean culture, and its implications in terms of nation-building.  
The details of idealized Korean culture are contested depending on the different 
values of classes they stem from, upper class (yangban) or middle and lower class 
(minjung). Nevertheless, in both cases, the idealized Korean culture is largely based 
on Neo-Confucianism, the ruling ideology of the Joseon dynasty (1392-1910).
22
 Since 
its introduction, Neo-Confucianism, which emphasizes loyalty, filial piety, ethical 
morality, benevolence, humanity, faithfulness and spiritual self-cultivation, as well as 
maintaining harmony within family, community, and state based on hierarchical 
relationships (between wife and husband, parents and children, young and elders, king 
and subject), has remained a fundamental part of Korean culture and nation.
23
 Neo-
Confucianism has influenced Korea‟s moral norms, its way of life, its social relations, 
and even the legal system of the nation.  
Idealized, Neo-Confucian Korean culture is deeply embedded in South Korean 
national identity precisely because the government has used this culture to foster a 
sense of national identity following the country‟s liberation from the Japanese 
occupation and subsequent division of the peninsula in 1945. According to Yim, the 
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Korean government has succeeded in establishing a strong national identity among 
Koreans through cultural policies that often emphasize the importance of idealized 
Korean culture.
24
 This national identity was critical to South Korea‟s economic and 
social development in the mid- and late 20
th
 century, and also for cohesion vis-à-vis 
North Korea.
25
 Thus the weakening of idealized culture, due to the increasing 
influence of individualism and notions of equality imported from the West, inevitably 
had a deep impact on the nation. 
The family crisis and the sense of erosion of idealized Korean culture are closely 
related to changes regarding the roles of Korean women in the private sphere. As 
Okin insightfully points out, the private sphere is at the center of many cultures 
because many cultural practices are carried out in the private sphere. For example, 
foodways are a significant part of culture, and food preparation and consumption 
takes place, most often, in the private sphere. In addition, personal laws concerning 
sex, reproduction, marriage and divorce, are also practiced and preserved primarily 
through family relationships within the private sphere. An ideal image of Korean 
culture is often symbolized by images of women who have traditional characteristics 
and perform traditional roles in the private sphere; obedient wives, wise mothers and 
servant-like daughters-in-law, who produce children (especially sons) to continue the 
paternal lineage, take charge of household management, especially looking after the 
younger and older generation, and work hard to help their husbands to increase family 
income so that their children can have better educational opportunities. Korean 
women are traditionally expected to make self-sacrificing efforts for their family 
members, to abandon their own identity, and devote their lives to familial roles.
26
  
As mentioned, these docile images of Korean women have often been used to 
represent idealized Korean culture. The Blue House (Cheongwadae, the executive 
office and official residence of the head of Korean state) often promotes such a vision 
overseas with images of the First Lady, Kim Yoon-ok, making Korean dishes (often 
wearing traditional Korean dress). During the 2010 G-20 Seoul Summit, the Blue 
House published a book purportedly authored by the First Lady, HANSIK: Stories of 
Korean Food by Kim, Yoon-Ok, and distributed copies to summit leaders and their 
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wives in order to promote Korean cuisine and culture.
27
 This example supports Okin‟s 
argument; that culture is more often expected to be enacted in the private sphere than 
the public sphere.
28
 Therefore women, as the prime actors in the private sphere, are 
more likely to be regarded as responsible for cultural performances. This is borne out 
in government practice.   
Nowadays, as more young Korean women than ever receive advanced levels of 
education, and frequently participate in the labor market, their conformity to their 
traditional functions in the private sphere has been weakened to a certain extent. 
Korean women have also been influenced by principles of gender equality, so many 
dislike conforming to patriarchal family norms, and insist on their right to determine 
whether to perform these traditional functions or how to do so. Nevertheless, in reality, 
gender roles in Korea have remained strongly dichotomized; in this dichotomy, men 
work outside the home and women stay at home doing domestic jobs, such as raising 
children. Many women in Korea now work outside the home, but they are still in full 
charge of duties in the private sphere. But although these changes in to traditional 
characteristics and functions of women have been limited, they have contributed to 
the discourses of the family crisis and the sense of an erosion of idealized Korean 
culture. In short, the family crisis that has, in part, resulted from changes to the 
traditional characteristics and functions of Korean women is, in fact, a crisis of 
idealized Korean culture, which is both strongly patriarchal, and the pillar of the 
nation. 
The sense of erosion of idealized Korean culture is also related to the relative decline 
and depopulation of Korea‟s rural areas, since Korean culture is idealized largely as it 
was seen to be in older, agrarian community lifestyles in which extended families 
were the norm. Because rural areas have been less influenced by modernity than 
urban areas, they tend to have preserved more characteristics of traditional Korean 
culture. In other words, rural areas have undergone a revival in the national 
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imagination as the cradle of ideal Korean culture, and people from urban areas or 
other countries often go to rural areas to experience and learn about Korean culture.
29
  
Until the 1970s, when industrialization and urbanization started to accelerate, the 
majority of the population lived in rural areas. However, in recent decades, the rural 
population has rapidly decreased and aged, and the function of the countryside as a 
center for ideal Korean culture has become uncertain. During the industrialization 
period in the late 20
th
 century, many young people, especially women from poor 
families, moved to cities to look for better employment opportunities to support their 
families, while their brothers stayed behind and continued to work on the family farm 
and care for their parents.
30
 This led to a sex-ratio imbalance among young people in 
rural areas, making it increasingly difficult for rural men to find brides. The sex-ratio 
imbalance in the latter part of the 20
th
 century was also caused, in part, by sex-
selective abortions, which created an overall shortage of brides.
31
 Additionally, since 
the country‟s entry to the WTO in 1995, the agricultural industry has become less 
profitable, and rural areas have become even less desirable for women. All of these 
factors made it hard for rural bachelors to find a Korean partner to start a new family. 
As the Korean countryside has become increasingly unsustainable, idealized Korean 
culture has been seen to be in growing danger of fading away.  
In summary, this section has shown how family, women, culture, rural areas and 
nation are intertwined in the Korean context. Koreans perpetuate the notion of an 
idealized Korean culture within a family that is based on Neo-Confucianism, that has 
its roots in rural areas, and that forms the patriarchal pillar of Korean nation. Family is, 
in general, the primary unit of social organization for most individuals, thus the 
influence of family members, especially of mothers, is crucial in building an 
individual‟s identity during the early stages of their life, an important facet of which is 
cultural identity. Women, in the Korean nation, are in charge of educating their 
children about cultural habits. Thus the erosion of idealized Korean culture through 
the family crisis and rural decline, which disrupts existing Korean national identity 
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and unity, and ultimately threatens the nation itself. Therefore, along with reviving 
rural areas, restoring the idealized family system in which women retain their 
traditional characteristics and perform traditional functions and roles has been a 
principal task for the Korean government.   
 
Female Marriage Migrants within a Patriarchal Family Structure 
Many female marriage migrants experience similar situations when they come to live 
in Korea, as they often join lower class families, especially families in rural areas 
where patriarchy remains strongest. Lower class families tend to have stronger 
traditional cultural traits in comparison to families that have been transformed (or 
Westernized) through modernization, since their relatively low socioeconomic status 
in society prevents them from doing otherwise. Many of the families in which female 
marriage migrants settle are these lower class families. This is because most Korean 
men who seek international marriages have low socioeconomic status; given that they 
are not seen as desirable partner in a competitive marriage market, they attempt to 
find a wife overseas.  
Rural bachelors are typical examples of marginalized men in Korean society, and the 
international marriage boom that began in the 1990s originated amongst them. Local 
governments contributed to this boom by launching a “Getting Rural Bachelors 
Married (nongchonchonggak janggabonaegi)” project, and enacted ordinances to 
financially support bachelors in finding a bride overseas and starting a family in their 
areas.
32
 Many of these Korean men looked for a wife overseas through international 
marriage brokers, who tend to follow a standard procedure, first taking customers 
(Korean men) on a seven to ten day trip to the country of origin of prospective 
brides.
33
 The men meet several potential brides, and choose one. After a hastily 
arranged wedding and registration of the marriage in the country of the bride‟s origin, 
the husband returns to Korea and registers the marriage again in Korea in order to be 
able to send his bride an invitation for immigration purposes. In this type of marriage, 
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the dating period is very short or even non-existent. Nonetheless, with this support 
from local governments, international marriages in rural areas reached 40% in 2006 
(nationally, the proportion of international marriages was only 11.9%).
34
  
As noted above, due to the rural origin of many of these Korean husbands, their 
families tend to have stronger patriarchal norms and structures. Of course, many of 
the brides also come from countries influenced by Confucianism, such as China or 
Vietnam, so may not struggle to adapt to these norms. However, in China and 
Vietnam, hierarchical Confucianism relations have been much weakened by 
Communist principles of gender equality.
35
 Many female marriage migrants from 
Vietnam, for example, grew up within families where mothers exerted a great deal of 
power. These women do experience difficulties in adapting to the patriarchal family 
system in Korea.
36
 Indeed, Koreans are well-known for having maintained a stronger 
Confucian legacy than other Asian countries.
37
 
The second situation that female marriage migrants share is that, by definition they 
have come to Korea for marriage with a Korean man. However, these women come to 
Korea not only to create a new nuclear household with a Korean husband, but as an 
arrival into an existing Korean family. In traditional thought, women in Korea were 
no longer considered as members of their own family when they married. Although 
this tradition has dissipated, women are still expected to assimilate into the family of 
their husband. Female marriage migrants are expected to leave their country of origin, 
and to become a full member of their husband‟s family. In addition, since they come 
to Korea for marriage, they are primarily situated in the private sphere unless they 
obtain a job after arriving in Korea, which is unlikely until they become familiar with 
the language and general society. As a result, these women lack a broader social 
footing, which makes them vulnerable to discrimination and abuse by members of 
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their new family.
38
 Their vulnerability in the household supports the feminist 
observation that the private sphere is not an intimate and romantic space, but a 
hierarchical space, and can be oppressive to women.  
A final condition for many female marriage migrants is that their Korean husband is 
often much older. In 2010, more than half (62.6%) of the international marriages 
between Korean men (excluding “naturalized” Korean men) and foreign brides, the 
husbands were at least ten years older than their wives, in comparison to a figure of 
3.2% for Korean couples.
39
 About half of female marriage migrants (46.6%) were in 
their twenties at the time of their marriage to a Korean husband, whereas their 
husbands were over 40.
40
 This is significant; Bradley, in particular, emphasizes the 
importance of age as a determining factor of social stratification alongside gender, 
ethnicity and class. Although she recognizes that age does not bring high status 
automatically, as she argues, it contributes.
 
In industrialized societies, the middle-aged 
are generally in relatively more powerful positions than younger or older age 
groups.
41
 In addition, contrary to Bradley‟s argument, age can in fact function as a 
determining factor if it is embodied in a culture which uses age as a primary factor in 
determining hierarchies. In Korea, even a one-year age gap can affect the level of 
politeness used in speech as a way of showing respect to the elder.  
Okin also identified this form of patriarchy based on age. Within immigrant 
communities, it is not only male leaders but also elderly women who are often co-
opted into reinforcing patriarchy, who support multicultural group rights to preserve 
cultural practices that might be oppressive for younger women.
42
 One of the most 
relevant examples of hierarchical relationships in Korea based on age is the 
relationship between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law. In Korean tradition, based 
as it is on Confucian ideology, women are expected to be subordinate to not only their 
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husbands, but also to their mother-in-law when they marry.
43
 The mother-in-law has 
authority to supervise and educate the daughter-in-law, and to punish her for 
wrongdoing.
44
 While the patriarchal characteristics of this style of relationship 
between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law have been weakened as a result of 
modernization and increasing diversity in family types, the tradition has not 
disappeared, and remains strong in some traditional families, especially in rural areas. 
Thus, the younger age of female marriage migrants makes them even more vulnerable 
to mistreatment or abuse from their older husband and other older members of the 
family, especially mothers-in-law. Significant age gaps and consequent differences in 
beliefs and lifestyle are often viewed as contributing to family conflicts.
45
  
Recently, a considerable number of incidents have raised concern about the 
seriousness of the issue of discrimination against, and abuse of, female marriage 
migrants in their own households. In 2008, a Vietnamese woman committed suicide 
after suffering violence at the hands of her husband and mother-in-law.
46
 In 2011, a 
Vietnamese woman was charged with an attempt to murder her mother-in-law by 
serving her a bowl of rice with rat poison added.
47
 She explained herself by saying “[I] 
was verbally abused and constantly [looked down] by [my mother-in-law].”48 Also in 
2011, another Vietnamese woman was stabbed to death by her Korean husband in 
front of their infant, because she asked him for a divorce.
49
 The following month, a 
memorial service was organized by a small group of female marriage migrants and 
Korean feminist activists for seven female marriage migrants to Korea who had 
officially been recognized as murdered in domestic violence cases.
50
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In addition, there has been increasing breakdown of multicultural families that consist 
of a foreign wife and a Korean husband, and the number of divorces among these 
families increased between 2004 and 2011 (see table 2). Of course, an increase in the 
number of divorce cases is not necessarily surprising considering that the number of 
international marriages between foreign brides and Korean men has grown 
substantially during the past decade. Nevertheless, this increase in divorce cases has 
contributed to a perception that multicultural families are unstable, therefore 
justifying government intervention into the private sphere of female marriage 
migrants.  
<Table 2. International Marriages and Divorces between 2004 and 2010>
51
   
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Marriage 
(foreign wives) 
25,105 30,719 29,665 28,580 28,163 25,142 26,274 22,265 
Marriage 
(foreign 
husbands) 
9,535 11,637 9,094 8,980 8,041 8,158 7,961 7,497 
Marriage 
(total) 
34,640 42,356 38,759 37,560 36,204 33,300 34,235 29,762 
Divorce 
(foreign wives) 
1,567 2,382 3,933 5,609 7,901 8,246 7,852 8,349 
Divorce 
(foreign 
husbands) 
1,733 1,789 2,203 2,685 3,079 3,227 3,236 3,146 
Divorce (total) 3,300 4,171 6,136 8,294 10,980 11,473 11,088 11,495 
 
In short, many female marriage migrants live primarily in the private sphere, 
incorporated into Korean families with much older family members who uphold a 
patriarchal system. The issue of discrimination against, and abuse of, female marriage 
migrants in their own households calls for government intervention, and the Korean 
government has implemented various policies in order to alleviate this issue (policies 
I will expand upon in Chapter Four). There are elements to this intervention that 
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feminist scholars may find praise-worthy; when Okin made her argument that the 
private sphere is oppressive for women, she was also (indirectly) criticizing the 
ignorance of governments in Western, pluralist societies regarding illiberal aspects of 
the private sphere. Unlike these governments, the Korean government has actively 
intervened in the private sphere to “protect” these women. However, this Korean 
government intervention has not necessarily been beneficial, because the government 
has intended to resolve the issue within, and with, the structure of a patriarchal family 
system. In addition, the government has used these women for the purpose of nation-
building, mobilizing female marriage migrants for just this purpose. In conclusion, by 
attempting to resolve the issue of discrimination in the private sphere, yet using these 
women for a nation-building purpose, the government breaches these women‟s rights 
and self-determination. In the next chapter, I will address this matter directly, showing 
how the Korean government has intervened in the private spheres of female marriage 
migrants, and will discuss the impacts of the intervention upon the women themselves.  
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Chapter Four: Female Marriage Migrants in South Korea’s Nation-Building 
 
This chapter looks at the government policies affecting female marriage migrants and 
their families, and examines the purposes of such policies. First, I will outline the 
policies implemented based on the Support for Multicultural Families Act of 2008, an 
act prescribing responses Korean government agencies should make to the needs of 
female marriage migrants and their families. This law requires provision of programs 
and services, including Korean language and culture classes, workshops on family 
relationships, and childcare and child education support. This law, and subsequent 
additional policies, supports these women in facilitating their adaptation to Korea, and 
in stabilizing their families.  
However, it is necessary to problematize the government‟s desire that female 
marriage migrants adapt to Korea, and that their families become stable. I now shall 
explore this desire in relation to the challenges that the nation has faced in recent 
years, and argue that the policies are designed to mobilize female marriage migrants 
to perform as symbols of an idealized Korean culture that upholds patriarchy, as 
biological and cultural reproducers of the nation, as caregivers for the elderly, and as 
saviors of rural communities. By using female marriage migrants for these purposes, 
the government intends to maintain national unity through reinforcing the patriarchal 
pillar of the nation. Secondly, the government intends to make Korea an advanced 
nation in the international arena through increasing national competitiveness based on 
unity and incubating multicultural children as valuable national resources for the 
future. 
 
Policies for Female Marriage Migrants and Their Families  
 
“You are a beloved wife.  
You are a respected mother.  
You are a wonderful daughter-in-law.  
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You are a valuable new citizen of Korea.  
[We] will be your reliable friend and we will help you plan for a brighter future in 
Korea.  
We love you.”1  
<From a guidebook Let’s Live a Happy Life in Korea published by the Ministry for 
Health, Welfare and Family Affairs, renamed as Ministry of Health & Welfare in 
2010>    
Government agencies have implemented a wide range of supportive policy measures 
for female marriage migrants and their families based on the Support for Multicultural 
Families Act. The act states that both central and local governments are responsible 
for helping female marriage migrants, not only with social adaptation, but also in 
having a happy, stable marriage and family life (Article 3).
2
 Government policy 
measures developed on the basis of the act are mainly delivered through the nation-
wide network of government-sponsored Multicultural Family Support Centers 
(MFSCs). Although there were only 37 MFSCs in 2007, by 2011 the number had 
reached 210.
3
 Since all MFSCs are under the control of the Ministry of Gender 
Equality & Family, they have similar structures, programs and services, but some 
have additional programs and services in order to meet local needs; for example, 
MFSCs in rural areas offer agricultural education programs. 
Most importantly, MFSCs offer educational programs and services to facilitate female 
marriage migrants‟ smooth adaptation to Korean family life and society (see table 1).4 
They provide female marriage migrants with classes in Korean language and culture, 
as well as skills based training, such as computer classes for employment 
opportunities. However, according to a team leader at the South Gyeongsang 
Provincial MFSC, the former type of education designed for integration of female 
                                                             
1 Ministry for Health, Welfare and Family Affairs, Republic of Korea, “Let‟s Live a Happy Life in 
Korea: Guide Book for Marriage-based Immigrants in Korea,” accessed 25 October 2011, 
http://www.129.go.kr.  
2 Ministry of Government Legislation, Republic of Korea, “Support for Multicultural Families Act,” 
accessed January 15, 2012, http://www.moleg.go.kr .  
3 Nam-il Kim, “We Are All Migrants,” Hankyoreh 21, April 25, 2012. 
4 Danuri (Multicultural Family Support Portal Site), “Multicultural Family Support Centers,” accessed 
Oct 15, 2011, http://www.liveinkorea.kr.  
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marriage migrants is the main focus of MFSCs rather than the later, since many 
MFSCs do not have capacity to deliver both.
5
 The MFSCs also offer translation and 
interpreting services, and free legal counseling services.
6
  
MFSCs also host various multicultural events such as multicultural markets, festivals, 
and advocacy seminars regarding multicultural society for members of multicultural 
families and the public. Nevertheless, the public interest is low; one of my 
interviewees said that voluntary participation of the public was so low that they had to 
ask local schools to send students to the multicultural festival to fill the empty space.
7
 
Also, during my field research I enrolled to attend one of the MFSC advocacy 
seminars regarding multicultural society, but I was informed a day before that the 
seminar had been canceled because of low participation.  
The existence of these multicultural activities does not mean an absence of 
assimilationist aspirations. As I argued in my introduction, the nation-building 
purpose of multiculturalism pursues national unity based on having shared a culture 
(traditional, political or civic) among people, thus it is almost inevitable to pursue 
assimilation to a certain degree. The quarterly magazine Rainbow, published by the 
Ministry of Gender Equality & Family frequently demonstrates these aspirations. For 
example, a fairy tale from the magazine tells a story about a female marriage migrant 
becoming a “Korean” who experienced difficulty in adapting herself to using 
chopsticks and eating spicy Korean food, but was determined to master these 
customs.
8
 In this story, her mother-in-law tells her foreign daughter-in-law “in order 
to become a Korean, you need to be good at using chopsticks...[and] eat garlic.” In 
fact, it has been widely argued by scholars that the Korean government intends to 
                                                             
5 Hyeon-hee Lee (Team Leader, South Gyeongsang Provincial Multicultural Family Support Center), 
in interview with the author, June 27, 2011.   
6 These programs and services are not unique to Korea; in fact, some other countries where 
immigration is common, such as Canada and New Zealand, also provide immigrants with these types 
of programs and services to help them to adapt to their new society. Examples include the PEI 
Association for Newcomers to Canada, “Immigrant Settlement and Adaptation Program (ISAP),” 
accessed May 7, 2012, http://www.peianc.com; Immigration New Zealand, “Settlement Services,” 
accessed May 7, 2012, http://www.immigration.govt.nz/. 
7 Hyeon-hee Lee (Team Leader, South Gyeongsang Provincial Multicultural Family Support Center), 
in interview with the author, June 27, 2011.   
8 Byeong-hee Im, “A Story of Natalie‟s Challenge to Become a Korean,” Rainbow, Spring vol. 9, 2010, 
10-12. 
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assimilate female marriage migrants to Korean family life and society through 
encouraging them to learn Korean language and culture at MFSCs.
9
  
Furthermore, MFSCs offer seminars and workshops to improve family relationships, 
consultation services to prevent breakdown of multicultural families, support services 
for pregnancy, childbirth, childcare and even child education, and emergency services, 
such as providing shelter for victims of domestic violence (see table below).
10
 These 
programs and services are not common in Western countries with histories of 
immigration, and are unique to Korea. They demonstrate the extent to which the 
Korean government intends to be involved in the private lives of female marriage 
migrants and their multicultural families, and the desire to manage of these families 
through policy measures.  
<Table 1. Support for Multicultural Families Act and related policy implementation in 
MFSCs‟ programs and services> 
SMFA MFSCs’ Programs & Services 
 Enhancement of 
understanding of 
multicultural families. 
 Regular seminars on multiculturalism. 
 Advocacy activities.  
 Provision of 
information about daily 
life and educational 
support. 
 Korean language and culture classes.  
 Social integration programs.  
 Employment education and support. 
 Measures for 
maintenance of equality 
in familial relationship. 
 Multicultural family integration classes, 
including classes on how to maintain 
happy family relationships with their 
husbands, wives or in-laws. 
 Multicultural family counseling services.  
                                                             
9 See, e.g., Hyun Mee Kim, “The State and Migrant Women: Diverging Hopes in the Making of 
„Multicultural Families‟ in Contemporary Korea,” Korea Journal 47, no. 4 (2007): 106; Kyoung-Hee 
Moon, “Analysis of „the Crisis of Multiculturalism‟ in Europe and Korean Multicultural Policies: 
Focusing on Policies for Female Migrants” (paper presented at the 2011 Association for Korean 
Studies in Europe Conference, Moscow State University, June 17-20, 2011); Ji-eun Kim, “The Making 
of “the Korean Wife”: The Institutionalization of Marriage Migration in the Cases of Vietnamese 
Women,” Seoul National University Cross-Cultural Studies 13, no. 2 (2007): 60. 
10 Danuri (Multicultural Family Support Portal Site), “Multicultural Family Support Centers.”  
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 Protection of support 
for victims of domestic 
violence.  
 Emergency support centers, providing 
temporary shelters and/or departure 
supporting services for victims. 
 Free legal counseling services.  
 Support for health 
management before and 
after childbirth. 
 Pregnancy and childbirth guide services. 
 Nurturing education.  
 Care and education of 
children.  
 Educational programs to be good 
parents.  
 Language development support services.    
 Education assistant services with 
reading, writing, homework. 
 Social skill development coaching 
services. 
 Provision of services in 
diverse languages.  
 Translation and interpreting services. 
 
These measures are not available for other categories of foreign residents. The Korean 
government has bluntly expressed its special interest in female marriage migrants and 
their families, especially their children. The statement quoted in the beginning of this 
chapter is addressed to female marriage migrants. Written in personal language, the 
statement shows the government‟s willingness to have female marriage migrants as 
legitimate members of Korean families and the Korean state, but, at the same time, its 
desire to reconstruct their identities within family. Neither this extraordinary level of 
acceptance by the government, nor this friendly approach, is applied to any other 
category of foreigners, not even male marriage-based immigrants. In fact, although 
the guidebook is published for both male and female marriage migrants, there is no 
special statement addressed to male marriage-based immigrants. This discriminatory 
government approach to female marriage migrants and male marriage-based 
immigrants exists because of the Korea‟s patrilineal family structure normative to 
Korean society. Female marriage migrants are perceived to be more legitimate 
members of society because they are married to a Korean man, while male marriage 
migrants are only married to a Korean woman.  
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Not surprisingly then, the programs and services at MFSCs are designed almost 
entirely for female marriage migrants. According to one MFSC worker whom I 
interviewed, the Ministry of Gender Equality & Family recently made a rhetorical 
announcement to MFSCs that other categories of foreign residents, such as foreign 
workers and North Korean refugees, are eligible to participate in these programs and 
receive some of the services offered.
11
 Nevertheless, the government has neither 
formally expanded the scope of beneficiaries of multiculturalism to include these 
foreign residents, nor implemented changes to the structure and content of the 
programs and services MFSCs provide to facilitate the participation of other 
categories of foreign residents than female marriage migrants.
12
 Therefore, MFSCs 
remain as government agencies for female marriage migrants exclusively. 
In fact, the Support for Multicultural Families Act is the only law enacted under the 
name of multiculturalism in Korea. This government‟s embrace of a particular group 
of foreign residents, female marriage migrants, under the name of multiculturalism 
while excluding other foreign residents shows a very limited domain for 
multiculturalism in Korea. In other words, Korean multiculturalism is only applicable 
to those foreign residents who come to Korea as a family member to a Korean citizen, 
particularly a male citizen. Thus even families are excluded from the multicultural 
framework when they consist of a foreign couple (without a Korean citizen), to say 
nothing of the exclusion of solo foreign workers. In this way, the government 
discriminates against the 90% of its foreign residents who are not female marriage 
migrants.  
However, the government approach to female marriage migrants is problematic. 
Though it is preferential, it is paradoxically discriminatory, in that it undermines these 
women‟s rights in terms of maintaining their own identity, or in terms of deciding 
how to rebuild their identity in Korea. This is because government policy measures 
encourage women to reconstruct their identities within, and in relation to, their family 
as wives, mothers and daughters-in-law in Korea. Another MFSC worker viewed a 
reconstruction of the identity of female marriage migrants as a member of their new 
family in Korea as important, especially in the early stage of their marriage, saying 
                                                             
11 Hyeon-hee Lee (Team Leader, South Gyeongsang Provincial Multicultural Family Support Center), 
in interview with the author, June 27, 2011.   
12 Ibid. 
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“female marriage migrants have come to Korea with the purpose of forming a 
family...their families are sustainable only when female marriage migrants find their 
own identities within the family...once they find their identities within family, [they 
can participate in society].” 13  Female marriage migrants are expected to devote 
themselves, at least for the first few years, to developing their new identities within 
the family, because they were allowed to come and live in Korea on the basis of 
marrying a Korean man and forming a family. This expectation could reasonably be 
said to form the basis of government justifications for putting pressure on female 
marriage migrants to assimilate to Korean family and society.   
Finally, I argue that the government approach is problematic because, as I will 
demonstrate in the next sections, it puts forward the characteristics and functions of 
traditional Korean women as the template that should be followed. In this way, the 
patriarchal family structure and culture are inculcated by the government into female 
marriage migrants. This approach encourages female marriage migrants to take on the 
roles in the private sphere, and often prevents these women from enhancing their 
social activities and footing. 
 
The Purposes of Female Marriage Migrants Policies 
The government acknowledges that the primary purpose in introducing multicultural 
family policies for female marriage migrants is to facilitate their adaptation to a new 
environment. The Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea takes precedence as a 
superordinate statute, and other laws and policies regarding foreign residents must 
comply with it.
14
 Article 12 of this Act says, “the state and local governments can 
support [marriage migrants and their children] by providing education on the Korean 
language, laws and culture, and [also] support for nurturing and education of the 
children [so that] they quickly adapt themselves to Korean society [emphasis 
added].”15 To accelerate adaptation, the government has implemented the policies 
                                                             
13 Interview with MFSC worker, June 27, 2011. 
14 Ministry of Government Legislation, Republic of Korea, “The Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in 
Korea,” accessed January 15, 2012, http://www.moleg.go.kr.  
15 Ibid. 
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outlined above and delivered them in practice through offering educational programs 
at MFSCs around the country.   
 
 
<From Let’s Live a Happy Life in Korea; “the transnational marriage & family-
support center” in the text is referred as Multicultural Family Support Centers in this 
thesis> 
It is worth noting that education is one area in which the government helps all foreign 
residents with their adaptation to Korean society, particularly by giving subsidies to 
social organizations, such as universities, to operate the Korea Immigration and 
Integration Program (KIIP).
16
 KIIP consists of different levels of Korean language 
                                                             
16 Ministry of Justice, Republic of Korea, “A Guide to Social Integration Program (KIIP),” accessed 24 
October 2011, http://www.kiip.kr/.  
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courses and a Korean society comprehension course. However, as I have underlined, 
the government puts a greater emphasis on the adaptation of female marriage 
migrants than they do on the adaptation of other foreign residents. This emphasis is 
evident in that in addition to the Korean language and cultural programs offered at 
MFSCs, the government encourages female marriage migrants to enroll in KIIP by 
offering to shorten the processing time for the naturalization of marriage migrants 
who complete KIIP, even exempting them from a written exam and interview for 
naturalization.
17
  
Through helping female marriage migrants with adaptation, the government intends to 
stabilize multicultural families, and to improve quality of life – not only for female 
marriage migrants themselves, but also for the Korean members of multicultural 
families. The Support for Multicultural Families Act says that the policies for female 
marriage migrants are “to contribute to the improvement of the quality of life [for 
members of multicultural families] by helping [them] to enjoy the stable family 
living.”18  
However, the government intention to stabilize multicultural families by encouraging 
female marriage migrants in better adaptation (or more specifically, better 
assimilation) to Korean family and society is, as I have noted, deeply problematic. 
The intention itself suggests that the government‟s view is that female marriage 
migrants should take the responsibility of constructing a happy family by improving 
their knowledge of Korean language and culture, while their Korean husband is 
relatively free from this responsibility. In addition, the government expectation that 
multicultural families will become more stable if female marriage migrants adapt 
themselves better to Korean family and society is naïve. It is not clear how much 
influence differing languages and cultures have had on the breakdown of multicultural 
families, because there are several reasons for the breakdown of multicultural families 
that must also be considered, including domestic violence, economic hardship, 
personality differences, unmet marriage conditions and disease.
19
    
                                                             
17 Ministry of Justice, Republic of Korea, “A Guide to Social Integration Program (KIIP).” 
18 Ministry of Government Legislation, Republic of Korea, “Support for Multicultural Families Act.”  
19 Korea Legal Aid Center for Family Relations, “Press Release- 2011 Statistics for Counseling of 
Multicultural Families,” accessed May 11, 2012, http://www.lawhome.or.kr. 
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Here it is necessary to ask why the government wants female marriage migrants to 
adapt themselves better to Korean family and society, and why it wants their families 
to become more stable. I argue that the very purpose of the special attention and 
government policies for female marriage migrants is to mobilize them to contribute to 
minimize the (perceived) negative impact of the challenges that Korea has faced in 
recent years, as I discussed in Chapter Three. I shall now demonstrate that these 
policies are designed to serve the patriarchal interests, and the nation-building 
purpose of multiculturalism, through encouraging female marriage migrants to 
perform as symbols of the idealized Korean culture, as biological and cultural 
reproducers of the nation, as caregivers for the elderly, and as saviors of rural 
communities. 
 
Female Marriage Migrants as Biological Reproducers 
First of all, through encouraging female marriage migrants to perform the functions of 
traditional Korean women, the government hopes to increase the country‟s birth rate. 
In recent years, government agencies have implemented extensive pro-natal policies 
for the general public; however, it has offered extra support for female marriage 
migrants and their multicultural families.
20
 For example, all multicultural families are 
entitled to receive “free” (a 100% subsidy based on a limit the government has 
defined) childcare and education for their children (between 0 to 5 years old), 
regardless of their total income.
21
 In contrast, the eligibility of families in which both 
parents are Korean to receive this support is determined by income.
22
 As mentioned 
earlier, the government has also provided female marriage migrants with home-based 
services to help them with pregnancy, childbirth and childcare. Once babies begin 
making verbal sounds, speech therapists from MFSCs visit multicultural families to 
help with language development. These services are only available for multicultural 
families, and they are also free.  
                                                             
20 For measures from each government agency, see Government of the Republic of Korea, “The 2nd 
Plan for Ageing Society and Population (2011-2015),” accessed April 26, 2012, 
http://momplus.mw.go.kr, 265. 
21 Government of the Republic of Korea, “The 2nd Plan for Ageing Society and Population (2011-
2015).”  
22 Ibid. 
62 
 
The reason the government provides multicultural families with pro-natal policies can 
be given as the fact that many multicultural families fall among the lower 
socioeconomic strata of Korea. But not all multicultural families are in a position that 
needs the special support. Explanation based solely on the generalization of 
multicultural families as being situated in the lower class neglects the underlying 
intention of policies for female marriage migrants and multicultural families; as Hyun 
Mee Kim argues, they are viewed as easier “targets” in the government‟s campaigns 
to increase the country‟s birth rate.
23
 The government has experienced difficulty 
increasing the country‟s birth rate through encouraging Korean families, because the 
incentives offered have not been strong enough to convince Korean families to 
comply.
 24
 Nowadays, raising children is increasingly considered a luxury activity. 
Not only do many people have an unstable and insecure employment status, few think 
they can afford to have multiple children, because of the high cost and investment of 
time involved in raising children.
25
  
But compared to families in which both parents are Korean, pro-natal policies for 
female marriage migrants and their families have been successful. The number of 
children born in multicultural families increased from 13,443 in 2008 to 20,312 in 
2010 (66% increase).
26
 This increase is even more significant given the fact that the 
number of international marriages decreased slightly from 42,356 in 2005 to 34,235 
in 2010 (the average marriage period for interethnic unions before having the first 
child is 2.7 years).
27
 By contrast, the number of newborns in Korean families in fact 
decreased from 452,449 in 2008 to 449,859 in 2010. This increase in the number of 
babies in multicultural families, combined with the decrease in the number in Korean 
families, increased the proportion of children born to multicultural families from 2.9% 
in 2008 to 4.3% in 2010.
28
 The proportion is higher in rural areas; in South Jeolla 
                                                             
23 Kim, “The State and Migrant Women: Diverging Hopes in the Making of „Multicultural Families‟ in 
Contemporary Korea,” 107. 
24 Ibid. 
25
 Ha-woon Seong, “How Many Children Do Husbands-to-be and Wives-to-be Want?” DongAilbo, 
June 23, 2011.  
26 Statistics Korea, “Multicultural Population Statistics,” accessed November 22, 2011, 
http://kostat.go.kr.  
27 Ibid.; Statistics Korea, “Status of International Marriages,” accessed April 28, 2012, 
http://kostat.go.kr. 
28 Statistics Korea, “Multicultural Population Statistics.”  
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Province, 7.8% of new-borns in 2010 were from multicultural families.
29
 As Statistics 
Korea explained, “areas where the number of multicultural families is increasing 
show a marked tendency to have a higher birth rate.”
30
 These figures show that female 
marriage migrants have been responding to the government‟s pro-natal policies, and 
contributing to the increase in the country‟s birth rate.  
It seems reasonable to accept Hyun Mee Kim‟s claim that female marriage migrants 
have been perceived by the government “as the most easily mobilized resources 
[emphasis added]” to resolve the twin issues of low birth rate and ageing population.
31
 
This perception, the view that female marriage migrants are biological reproducers of 
members of the nation is, of course, deeply problematic; these women are essentially 
considered instruments of Korean reproduction. Thus, the government‟s view is little 
different from the popular view of female marriage migrants as “human-beings that 
reproduce children after getting married to Korean men.”
32
 The government view 
therefore undermines women‟s self-determination regarding having children, and 
their reproductive rights, including the right not to have children.  
Government management of female marriage migrants becomes even more 
problematic when the rights of female marriage migrants become dependent on 
whether they have reproduced. The processing time for naturalization applications of 
female marriage migrants takes twice as long if no child is born between marriage 
migrants and a Korean spouse.
33
 Also, in cases of divorce before obtaining Permanent 
Residency or Korean citizenship, a marriage migrant‟s visa (F-2) expires immediately, 
and they are required to leave the country or remain as an “illegal” foreign resident.
34
 
However, if female marriage migrants have a child with a Korean spouse and are 
                                                             
29 Statistics Korea, “Multicultural Population Statistics.” 
30 Tae-ok Lee, “High Birth Rates in Areas Having Many Multicultural Families,” Korean Famers and 
Fishermen Newspaper, September 3, 2009.  
31 Kim, “The State and Migrant Women: Diverging Hopes in the Making of “Multicultural Families” in 
Contemporary Korea,” 108. 
32 Ae-gyeong Yang et al., “A Study of Acceptability of Female Marriage-based  
Immigrants to Local Communities,” Korean Women’s Development Institute Study Reports (2007): 70.  
33 Korean Women‟s Association United, “NGO Shadow Report: Republic of Korea, An Examination 
of the 7th Periodic Report by the Republic of Korea (2006-2009) on the Implementation of the UN 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,” accessed October 21, 
2011, http://www.women21.or.kr, 28-9; Won-joo Lee and Sae-saem Lee, “Weak Protection for 
Divorced Women,” DongAilbo, February 14, 2011.  
34 W. Lee and S. Lee, “Weak Protection for Divorced Women.”  
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looking after the child, they are legally allowed to remain in the country.
35
 This 
provision is not applicable to children from previous relationships in their country of 
origin, because the father is not a Korean citizen.   
Finally, with regard to law, before the mid-2000s when the country‟s birth rate 
plummeted and the government began to see female marriage migrants as the solution, 
the on-going issues of discrimination against, and abuse of, female marriage migrants 
were not taken seriously in the government realm, and there was no special policy to 
protect the rights of these women. As Hyun Mee Kim points out, it does not seem a 
coincidence that the neglectful attitudes of the government suddenly changed when 
the government started to see the potential benefit in having female marriage migrants 
produce members of the nation.
36
 Therefore, it can be argued that the government 
intends to protect the rights of female marriage migrants on the condition that female 
marriage migrants remain beneficial in improving Korea‟s current crisis of a low birth 
rate and an ageing population. 
 
Female Marriage Migrants as Cultural Reproducers 
In addition to performing as biological reproducers of the nation, female marriage 
migrants are required also to perform as cultural reproducers, raising their children as 
valuable citizens for Korea. In the course of implementing various policies for female 
marriage migrants and their multicultural families that are aimed to construct a 
“world-class” country, children of multicultural families are viewed by the 
government as “valuable social resources.”37 President Lee Myung-bak has bluntly 
expressed the government‟s hope that the multicultural children will become talented 
adults, who will contribute to the global marketing of Korea and strengthen the 
country‟s diplomatic ties with the countries of their mothers.38 In order to utilize these 
                                                             
35 Korean Women‟s Association United, “NGO Shadow Report: Republic of Korea, An Examination 
of the 7th Periodic Report by the Republic of Korea (2006-2009) on the Implementation of the UN 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,” 28-9. 
36 Kim, “The State and Migrant Women: Diverging Hopes in the Making of „Multicultural Families‟ in 
Contemporary Korea,” 107. 
37 Ministry of Justice, Republic of Korea, “The First Basic Plan regarding Policy for Foreigners, 2008-
2012,” accessed January 10, 2012, http://www.moj.go.kr, 34. 
38 KTV (Government Broadcasting Service), “President Lee 44th Radio & Internet Speech,” accessed 
April 10, 2012, http://www.ktv.go.kr.    
65 
 
“valuable social resources” for the purpose of national advancement, the government 
has encouraged female marriage migrants to help their children use their bicultural 
background to cultivate bilingual language ability.  
However, in reality, the government seems obsessed with making multicultural 
children master Korean language skills. This government obsession is probably 
because of concern that a lack of such skills has led to a low performance of 
multicultural children at school, and in severe cases causes emotional instability.
39
 
The multicultural childrens‟ struggle with internalizing Korean language and culture 
has led to a widespread worry that they may become “juvenile delinquents” as they 
grow, falling into the lower class and weakening social unity in the future.
40
 As 
Moon‟s argument (which I drew on in Chapter One) mentions, terrorist attacks and 
riots in European countries have contributed to concern over the potential for 
multicultural children to cause social problems in Korea. In order to prevent this, the 
government has emphasized early Korean language education for these children. 
The language and cultural programs provided by the government for female marriage 
migrants are offered, in part, based on an expectation that they will help multicultural 
children build Korean national identity. In this way the assimilationist Korean 
language and cultural programs offered at MFSCs are justified on the grounds that 
these programs enable them to better perform the function of being cultural 
reproducers for their multicultural children.  
In addition, the government intends to help multicultural children with language 
development by providing them with speech therapy services, and most MFSCs have 
professional speech therapists on staff. But this government approach to resolving the 
issue of language development of multicultural children is problematic too, because it 
allows Korean men to avoid their responsibility to participate in and contribute to the 
development of their child‟s language and cultural identity. Instead of encouraging 
these Korean men, the government hires a third party (usually women) in order to 
help female marriage migrants to successfully perform the function of being cultural 
reproducers.  
                                                             
39 Gi-woo Jang and In-Mo Lee, “Current Status of Korean & Mother Tongue Education,” DongAilbo, 
June 13, 2011.  
40 Jong-gwan Lee et al., Report on Quality of Life for Koreans in 2040 (Seoul: Hybrid-Culture 
Institution, Sungkyunkwan University, 2010), 196-7. 
66 
 
With regard to the above, my field research revealed an interesting characteristic in 
MFSCs; feminization. As discussed, the majority of program participants and service 
recipients are female marriage migrants and their families, but in addition, most 
workers in the centers were also women (I met only one male, a manager). No official 
documents specify that the programs and services of MFSCs are only for female 
marriage migrants. In principle, as noted above, male marriage-based immigrants and 
their family members are also entitled to use MFSC services. However, according to 
one worker, virtually none do so.
41
 In practice, MFSCs are predominantly used, and 
also operated by, women.  
This feminization of MFSCs is evidence of the continuing dichotomy in gender roles 
in Korean society, and of the government‟s indulgent attitudes in exempting Korean 
men from sharing responsibilities in the private sphere. A significant proportion of 
MFSC programs are related to child nurturing and education. Since nurturing and 
educating children are considered to be women‟s jobs, MFSCs are predominately 
used and operated by women. MFSCs, on the one hand, can be viewed as agencies to 
help female marriage migrants carry out all their new responsibilities and duties. 
However, on the other hand, they can be viewed as agencies that enable the 
government‟s compliance with the patriarchal norm that Korean men should be 
exempt from sharing those responsibilities and duties.  
 
Female Marriage Migrants as Caregivers  
In addition to regarding female marriage migrants as responsible for children, the 
government also views them as caregivers for elderly Koreans. As already mentioned, 
the government has intended to alleviate the lack of caregiving services, and the 
increasing financial burden in expanding the welfare service, through restoring a 
sense of family loyalty, and re-traditionalizing families toward the more self-
sufficient extended family structure.  
                                                             
41 Hyeon-hee Lee (Team Leader, South Gyeongsang Provincial Multicultural Family Support Center), 
in interview with the author, June 27, 2011.   
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In the magazine Rainbow, stories of female marriage migrants who live within the 
traditional extended family structure frequently appear.
42
 The cover of this magazine 
often shows photos of happy female marriage migrants and extended Korean family 
members (see photos below).
43
  
 
<Rainbow magazine cover page images; the left image (vol.9) shows a Cambodian 
female marriage migrant (purple top)  and her four-generational extended family and 
the right image (vol. 11) shows a Filipina woman (with a baby) and her extended 
Korean family members> 
The above are typical images of multicultural families in government use. They show 
patterns that demonstrate the government‟s perception of the ideal multicultural 
family; the families commonly have at least one child, and they have an extended 
family structure. Rainbow magazine also imposes the idea of becoming good 
daughters-in-law on female marriage migrants by frequently highlighting the 
desirable characteristics such “good” daughters-in-law should have. For example, the 
accompanying article includes a quote from the mother-in-law pictured in the image 
on the right side, in which she praises her daughter-in-law: “[she is] good-hearted, 
smart [in reference to the rapidly improving Korean language skills of her daughter-
in-law], a good cook, [and] respectful to elders.”44 In addition, most of the people on 
the images are smiling and appear happy. The government tends to overuse the word 
                                                             
42 See, e.g, Myeong-ah Lee, “Sunborei‟s  Four-generation Family,” Rainbow, Spring (Vol. 09), 2010. 
43 See the cover pages of the Rainbow magazines Spring (Vol. 09), 2010; Summer (Vol. 10), 2010; 
Autumn (Vol. 11), 2010; Winter (Vol. 12), 2010.   
44 Won-young Gang, “Neither More nor Less, But Loving the Right Amount As Now,” Rainbow, 
Autumn vol. 11, 2010, 9. 
68 
 
happy or happiness (haengbok) in relation to multicultural families, which obscures 
the issue of discrimination against, and abuse of, female marriage migrants in their 
own households. This was also apparent in 2008, when more than a dozen female 
marriage migrants were chosen by local governments and the Ministry of Public 
Administration and Security as model settlement cases.
45
 Most of these women had 
mastered the Korean language, successfully assimilated to the Korean culture, worked 
hard at home and on family farms (or had a job using their language skills), produced 
children, and also lived with their (often sick) parents-in-law and served them with 
devotion.  
Further evidence suggests that the government is essentially hiring these women as 
caregivers for the elderly. A marriage migrant‟s visa expires immediately if a 
marriage dissolves before they obtain permanent residency or citizenship. However, if 
female marriage migrants are in a position to look after the parents of their ex-
husbands, they are allowed to remain in the country and to seek permanent residency 
and citizenship in the future.
46
 If it seems unusual to expect women to look after their 
ex-husband‟s parents, then it may seem even more unusual for the government to 
encourage these women to carry on in this role by providing an inducement in the 
form of residential rights.  
In short, through encouraging female marriage migrants to master the self-sacrificing 
characteristics of idealized Korean women, and to maintain patriarchal family 
structures central to the extended form of family, the government hopes to reduce its 
rapidly increasing burden of providing caregiving services to the elderly. Relying, in 
part, on female marriage migrants to provide caregiving services is used as a cheaper 
and more culturally appropriate way for the government to deal with the problem of 
its ageing population. 
 
Female Marriage Migrants as Saviors of Rural Communities 
                                                             
45 National Conference on Exemplary Cases of Marriage Migrant Settlement and Workshop for 
Exploring Desirable Multicultural Family Policies (Published by Ministry of Public Administration 
and Security and Korea Local Authorities Foundation for International Relations, 2008), 13-76.  
46 Korean Women‟s Association United, “NGO Shadow Report: Republic of Korea, An Examination 
of the 7th Periodic Report by the Republic of Korea (2006-2009) on the Implementation of the UN 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,” 28. 
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As already mentioned, many local governments provide rural bachelors with financial 
support to find a bride overseas, and to start a family with her. By doing this, these 
governments expect the men to stay in their areas and contribute to the revival of their 
communities.
47
 These governments also hope the wives to contribute by encouraging 
them to produce children to increase the rural population. In addition to producing 
children, female marriage migrants are expected to contribute to the alleviation of the 
labor shortage caused by the exodus of young people from rural areas. By 2005, the 
proportion of people over 60 in rural areas had reached almost 40%, and it is expected 
to increase to 62% by 2020.
48
 An ageing population means that there are not enough 
healthy young people who can work on farms. A survey, designed to investigate the 
problem of the labor shortage in rural areas, reveals that about 83% of the survey 
participants (farm owners) have been experiencing hardship because of labor 
shortages.
49
 Local governments and rural communities often consider female 
marriage migrants as a substitute labor force and hope that these women will 
contribute to the agricultural industry, and in the revival of rural communities. In 
order to mobilize female marriage migrants as a workforce, MFSCs and other groups 
dedicated to agricultural development, such as the National Agricultural Cooperative 
Federation, offer agricultural education programs that also include lessons on 
agricultural policy and Korean farm culture.
50
  
As well as alleviating the labor shortage, these agricultural education programs are 
often advertised by the same organizations as a way of empowering female marriage 
migrants by helping them develop both farming and entrepreneurial skills.
51
 However, 
the reality falls far short of empowerment. Many female marriage migrants, in fact, 
have difficulty in pursuing their careers in farming because they are expected to do all 
the housework for the family at the same time. Among those women who participate 
                                                             
47 South Gyeongsang Province Comprehensive Information System for Administration of Justice, 
“Gyeonsangnamdo Provincial Rural Bachelor International Marriage Support Act,” accessed October 
21, 2011, http://law.gndo.kr .  
48 Jin-cheol Kim, “In 10 years, 60% of Rural Population Will be Senior Citizens,” The Hankyoreh, 
December 30, 2007.  
49
 Byeong-ryul Kim et al., The Current Situation of Korean Agriculture Employment and Future Labor 
Policy in Korean Agriculture (Seoul: Korea Rural Economic Institute, 2010), 1.  
50 Ministry for Health, Welfare and Family Affairs, Republic of Korea, “Let‟s Live a Happy Life in 
Korea: Guide Book for Marriage-based Immigrants in Korea.”  
51 Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, “Policy Report; 2011 Status for Support of 
Multicultural Families in Farming and Fishing Communities,” accessed May 11, 2012, 
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in family farming, a significant proportion (46.2%) said their primary difficulty is 
carrying out housework as well as farming.
52
 Their chores at home also prevent them 
from participating in the agricultural education programs. A survey revealed that 
about 81.8% of female marriage migrants in rural areas, whose husbands are farmers, 
participate in family farming.
53
 57% of these women answered that they participate in 
farming as auxiliary laborers in order to help their family members, rather than 
participating on an equal footing with their husbands. 23% said they have a similar 
workload to other family members, while 2% said they do the most of the work. In 
addition, the traditional sex labor division in farming also makes it difficult for female 
marriage migrants to empower themselves by pursuing a career in farming. It is 
revealed that the contribution of female marriage migrants in family farming is 
limited to labor-intensive chores, especially in small farming areas, and in wider 
commercial farming areas (over 5 hectares) their contribution diminishes, which 
indicates the pattern of traditional sex labor division in farming work.
54
 Therefore the 
agricultural programs offered by MFSCs (and agricultural groups) may have 
succeeded in alleviating the problem of the labor shortage, which contributes to the 
revival of rural communities, but they have failed to empower female marriage 
migrants because they do not address the existing patriarchal attitudes and practices 
that are normative to family and farming industry. Instead these programs reinforce 
patriarchy by encouraging female marriage migrants to master the self-sacrificing 
characteristics of idealized traditional Korean women, and to accomplish a variety of 
tasks.   
Female marriage migrants from rural areas who work outside of agriculture are 
described by people who work in the agricultural industry as having “deserted” 
agriculture.
55
 In fact, the term “desertion” is commonly used by the government in 
reference to female marriage migrants who fail to perform their expected familial 
roles as a family member, by divorcing or otherwise abandoning their husband.
56
 
                                                             
52 Hye-jung Kang, “A Factual Analysis of Agricultural Activities of Female Marriage-based 
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53 Ibid., 138. 
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From this language, it is apparent that the expectation of local governments and rural 
communities that female marriage migrants become good family members and 
valuable rural laborers undermines their autonomy, and can lead to condemnation of 
these women when they fail to fulfill the responsibilities that are expected of them 
upon arrival. 
To summarize, this chapter has examined the ways in which female marriage 
migrants are mobilized by the government to perform a particular set of functions by 
the government implementation of policies through the nation-wide network of 
MFSCs: symbols of idealized Korean family and culture; biological reproducers; 
cultural reproducers; caregivers; and saviors of rural communities. Weakening of 
traditional family values and functions, which are at the center of the idealized 
Korean culture, and thus grounds the nation, has been perceived as a threat to the 
nation. Therefore, the Korean government has attempted to minimize negative 
impacts of this threat by encouraging female marriage migrants to assimilate into 
Korean family life and culture in order, by enabling them to symbolize traditional 
family values and to perform traditional family functions, so that the idealized Korean 
culture can survive, and thus the nation.  
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Conclusion  
 
Each multicultural society is different in terms of the strength and extensiveness of its 
multiculturalism; however all multicultural countries have pursued a nation-building 
project even under multiculturalism.
1
 As long as the purpose of nation-building 
continues under multiculturalism, countries inevitably deploy assimilationist 
aspirations in order to maintain unity among their citizens, regardless of whether they 
nominally uphold monocultural, bicultural or multicultural ideologies. Citizens, 
regardless of their country of origin, are required to assimilate to the nation. By 
limiting the definition of multiculturalism to those societies that have a more pluralist 
form, as Okin did, feminist scholars have treated the pluralist form of 
multiculturalism as the only form of multiculturalism, focusing on the conflict 
between cultural rights and gender equality. As a result, they have tended to ignore 
the gendered implications of the assimilationist principle that forms the basis of the 
nation-building purpose of multiculturalism, even when it is not so obvious.  
My study has addressed this gap in the feminist literature concerning multiculturalism, 
and contributed by shifting the feminist focus on pluralist forms of multiculturalism to 
an example of a more assimilationist form. In particular, I have analyzed the Korean 
government‟s purposes in the implementation of multicultural family policies 
affecting female marriage migrants and their multicultural families. By doing so, I 
have demonstrated that Korean multiculturalism is largely formulated for the nation-
building purpose of reviving idealized Korean culture and strengthening national 
competitiveness in the globalized era by minimizing the negative impacts of the 
challenges that the nation has faced since the late 20
th
 century.  
The industrialization, modernization and globalization of the second half of the 20
th
 
century brought about significant changes in Korea, notably an increase in the 
breakdown of families, visible in the weakening of traditional loyalties, and a 
lessened willingness among women to perform traditional reproductive and 
caregiving functions, as well as rural depopulation and decline. All these changes 
represent an erosion of idealized Korean culture and are perceived as “threats” to the 
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nation and its development; among these, the low birth rate has been seen as the most 
significant. Thus increasing the birth rate became the most critical and urgent task for 
the Korean government, and by solving this issue, they hope to alleviate the effects of 
other problems, particularly the ageing of the population, and rural depopulation and 
decline. When the country‟s birth rate plummeted to a record low in the mid-2000s, 
the government implemented various family and pro-natal policies for the general 
public and, realizing its policies had been ineffective in convincing Korean women to 
have more children, targeted female marriage migrants with a special set of policies, 
seeing these women and their families as more likely to help with the goal of raising 
the birth rate. The government has strategically mobilized female marriage migrants 
by providing them with supportive policy measures under the name of 
multiculturalism.  
This nation-building purpose to Korean multiculturalism means, at times 
paradoxically, that government policies compromise the human rights of female 
marriage migrants. Multicultural family policies encourage female marriage migrants 
to assimilate to Korean family life and society, and to reconstruct their identities as 
idealized Korean wives, mothers and daughters-in-law so that these women are able 
to perform traditional reproductive and caregiving functions and, by adapting well, 
stabilize their families. In order to achieve these goals, the government, interpreting 
the adaptation of female marriage migrants to Korea, and the stability of their families, 
as an indicator of success in mitigating the negative impacts of social change, has 
intervened in the private lives of these women through multicultural family policies. 
This intervention violates the rights of these women and their self-determination, 
especially in matters of identity, reproduction, and career choice.  
Overall, as I have demonstrated, Korean multiculturalism is essentially constructed 
for a nation-building purpose and female marriage migrants are at the core of this 
process. In the implementation of multicultural family policies, the government 
announced that such policies had been designed to build a “world-class Korea 
[emphasis added].”2  That such a narrative grounds multiculturalism explains why 
                                                             
2 Ministry of Justice, Republic of Korea, “The First Basic Plan regarding Policy for Foreigners, 2008-
2012,” accessed January 10, 2012, http://www.moj.go.kr, 13.  
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multiculturalism has been so easily embraced by nationalists in Korea.
3
 My study has 
argued that in the process of nation-building and pursuing national interest within a 
multicultural framework, the government has ignored the negative impacts of 
patriarchy on women; in fact, it treats patriarchy as the foundation of the nation, and 
uses patriarchal family norms as templates for constructing a multicultural society. In 
this multicultural, yet patriarchal, nation-building project, the rights of female 
marriage migrants are more readily violated than those of Korean women because of 
the perception of foreign women as “easier targets.”  
I share Western feminists‟ concern about the erosion of gender equality under 
multiculturalism. However, by introducing the Korean case study, I argue that cultural 
relativism and pluralism are not the only factors that undermine the principle of 
gender equality under multiculturalism. In addition, expanding the scope of 
multiculturalism in the feminist literature concerned with it is necessary, since 
multiculturalism does not exist exclusively in Western, democratic, pluralist countries. 
As I noted in the introduction, there has been no consensus between countries - or 
even within a country - on what multiculturalism means, whether in normative, 
theoretical or practical terms.  
As I have shown in this thesis, a particularly problematic aspect of multiculturalism in 
policy and design is its nation-building purpose and the resultant gendered 
implications. As has been the case throughout South Korea‟s history, the 
government‟s nation-building project is patriarchal in nature, and this is no less true 
of its brand of multiculturalism. Female marriage migrants are expected to take on 
passive roles as symbols of traditional feminine domesticity within an idealized 
Korean family and culture, and to become reproducers of the nation. The Korean 
government embraces female marriage migrants because they are seen as “valuable 
resources” for its nation, yet relegates them to an inferior position within that nation. 
Thus in mobilizing female marriage migrants for nation-building, no room exists for 
gender equality. My study therefore supports feminist theories of nationhood and the 
ways in which gendered roles are central to the nation-building process.  
                                                             
3 Kyung-Koo Han, “The Archaeology of the Ethnically Homogeneous Nation-State and 
Multiculturalism in Korea,” Korea Journal 47, no. 4 (2007): 11. 
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Furthermore, the problem of discrimination against, and abuse of, female marriage 
migrants in their own households is used by the Korean government as a justification 
for its intervention in the private sphere of multicultural families. This reconfirms the 
feminist insight that discourses of power and hierarchical relationships (often framed 
as a valued part of a given group‟s culture), rather than romance and intimacy, 
prescribe and determine the private sphere. My study, then, contributes to feminist 
literature on multiculturalism by highlighting the oppressive aspects of the private 
sphere caused by the perceived importance of nation-building, and the way in which 
nation-building is enacted in the private sphere. In other words, I have argued that 
female marriage migrants are oppressed in their own households, not only because of 
family hierarchy, but also because of government intervention for public and national 
interest.  
In short, the feminist literature on multiculturalism has focused on the lives of 
immigrant women in liberal Western democracies, oppressed by the retention of 
patriarchy brought from their countries of origin. However, my study has focused on 
an oppression of women who have entered to a dominant (Korean) culture, and 
argued that they are oppressed due to a patriarchal society and nation-building based 
on patriarchy.  
I wish to reiterate the main points of my study for the feminist literature of 
multiculturalism: first, feminist scholars who write on multiculturalism need to 
expand their scope of analysis to include assimilationist examples and their gendered 
implications for women, since no multicultural country is free from such aspects. 
Secondly, the feminist literature of multiculturalism needs to expand its focus on the 
existence of patriarchy, not only within minority groups, but within the dominant 
culture of multicultural countries, and its impacts on immigrant women. Looking at 
patriarchy within the dominant culture becomes even more important when taking 
account of Song‟s insight (introduced in Chapter Two) that patriarchy does not exist 
solely within minority groups themselves, but strengthens as it interacts with 
patriarchy present in the society more broadly. In order to provide a nuanced feminist 
critique of multiculturalism, scholars must take into account societies with strongly 
assimilationist aspirations, as I have done with my account of the impact of patriarchy 
upon female marriage migrants in Korea. 
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Appendix 1. List of Interviewees  
 Organization  
Number of 
interviewee(s) 
Name (Position) 
MFSCs 
South Gyeongsang Provincial 
Multicultural Family Support 
Center 
2 
Lee, Hyeon-hee (Team 
Leader) 
Anonymous  
Haman-gun Multicultural 
Family Support Center 
2 Anonymous  
Namhae-gun Multicultural 
Family Support Center 
1 Anonymous  
NGOs 
Migrant World TV 1 
Soe Moe Thu 
(Producer/Reporter) 
Asian Women‟s Community/ 
Incheon Women‟s Hotline 
1 
Kim, Seongmikyeong 
(President) 
Changwon Migrant Center (in 
Sungsan Community Social 
Welfare Center) 
1 Anonymous 
Changwon Women‟s Hotline 2 Anonymous 
Gyeongnam Migrant 
Community Service Center 
1 Anonymous 
 
 
Appendix 2. List of Interview Questions 
1. Please explain generally about the work system of MFSCs (regarding funding, 
the delivery route of the programs and services and the relationships with the 
city council, the provisional office, the central government and the local 
NGOs). Or, for interviewees from NGOs, please explain about your 
organization and work in relation to foreign residents (especially female 
marriage-based immigrants). 
2. Please explain the main characteristics of the local environments in which the 
MFSC or your organization is based. 
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3. What are the current issues surrounding foreign residents in general, and 
international marriages and multicultural families in particular? What are the 
reasons for the conflicts within multicultural families?  
4. What are the purposes of the policies that are designed for marriage-based 
immigrants and multicultural families? 
5. Have the policies been effective in achieving the purposes? Do you agree with 
the intentional outcomes of the policies and the way they have been 
implemented? Why? Why not? 
6. What are the issues or difficulties in the course of the implementation of the 
policies? And what are the criteria for an evaluation of the policies? 
7. Are there any similarities or differences between female marriage-based 
immigrants and Korean women in terms of difficulties they face in their own 
households? 
8. How are the policies likely to be transformed or should they be transformed in 
the near future?  
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